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Chapter 1
Introduction
In human societies, the desire of two parties to communicate in secret dates back
at least as far as the first known societies themselves [1]. When the two parties
are not in perfect isolation, that is, when the messages they exchange may become
available to outsiders, the best known technique to achieve secrecy is cryptography.
Cryptography is about concealing the meaning of communicated messages from any
unintended recipients. This is traditionally achieved by the following scheme: The
legitimate parties share a relatively small amount of secret information, a key, based
upon which the sender chooses a transformation, and the receiver another transfor-
mation that perfectly undoes the effect of the former. Each message is transformed,
i.e. encrypted, by the sender before sending the message, and then re-transformed,
i.e. decrypted, by the receiver to recover the original message. Only receivers in pos-
session of the correct key know exactly which decrypting transformation to apply.
Today, secrecy of communication is not compromised by lack of secure encryption-
decryption schemes, but is rather hindered by the complicated problem of delivering
the needed encryption-decryption keys safely. This fact is nicely exemplified by a
cryptographic protocol known as the one-time pad, first proposed by J. Mauborgne
[2]. The one-time pad scheme requires that the two communicating parties share in
advance a secret key that is as long as the message they wish to transmit. Assuming
that the key and the message are in binary form, i.e., strings of zeroes and ones, both
the sender and the receiver apply the bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation: Each
bit in the message to be sent is flipped if and only if the corresponding bit in the key
2has value one. After reception, the receiver performs exactly the same operation,
and recovers the original message. As long as the key is never reused, the one-time
pad is unbreakable. That is, without knowledge of the key, the communication is
perfectly secret.
The one-time pad keys are far from a relatively small amount of secret information,
and hence agreeing on them is in general a daunting task. Therefore, the one-time
pad as such is not of much practical value, despite its extreme security. Instead of
insisting on perfect security, contemporary protocols use a rather short key many
times but involve transformations more complicated than a single bitwise XOR.
These protocols are, in principle, vulnerable to careful analysis of a large amount
of captured, although encrypted, communication. With key lengths of 128 to 256
bits, however, cryptographic protocols employing, e.g., the Advanced encryption
standard (AES) algorithm, are considered secure enough [3].
One way of solving the problem of key distribution is to utilize asymmetric public-
key encryption which is in widespread use today. In public-key encryption schemes,
two parties desiring secret communication need not share any secret information in
advance. The intended receiver of the messages can give the sender a public key
which the sender uses to encrypt messages. Messages encrypted with the public key
can only be decrypted with a corresponding private key. Public-key encryption is
usually used to exchange keys for symmetric encryption-decryption schemes that
use only one key, for example, AES-based protocols.
In public-key encryption schemes, deducing the private key from the public key is
generally considered hard, i.e., the deduction would take an overwhelming amount
of time on any computer. However, this conjecture has never been proved. Thus,
it is possible that this deduction can be performed in a reasonable amount of time.
Moreover, it is known that the public-key to private-key deduction is feasible on a
large-scale quantum computer, but the demanding task of constructing such a device
remains yet to be accomplished. Because of the possibility of recording encrypted
transmissions, the security of not only future but also all past public-key-encrypted
communication is based on a conjecture of the difficulty of the key deduction.
The history of quantum cryptography can be considered to begin in 1969. By
then, the peculiar properties of quantum physics, discovered in the early decades
3of the 20th century, had not only been developed into a rigorous theory, but also
increasingly adopted by scientists. In 1969, Stephen Wiesner introduced1 the idea
of forgery-proof quantum banknotes [5]. These banknotes would contain a serial
number encoded by the issuing bank into quantum states of individual particles. By
the laws of quantum mechanics, anyone unaware of the details of the encoding could
not produce copies of the banknotes. Although this idea of uncloneable sequence
of numbers is not an essential primitive or function in quantum cryptography, the
next milestone in the field owes much to its insight [6].
This milestone is the quantum key distribution protocol of C. H. Bennett and
G. Brassard published in 1984 [7]. The protocol, referred to as BB84, describes
how two spatially separated parties can generate a random bit string, a sequence
of zeroes and ones, fully known only to them. The protocol exploits properties of
single quanta predicted by quantum physics. The sender transmits a sequence of
individual particles, e.g., photons, each in one of four equally probable quantum
states. Any eavesdropping on the states of the particles between the sender and
the intended receiver inevitably introduces disturbance to the transmission, which
can later be detected by the legitimate parties. In addition, an eavesdropper has
only bounded information on the established bit sequence. These properties are
guaranteed by the laws of physics: An eavesdropper can only gain knowledge on the
transmission by measurements. The states of the particles are chosen so that any
physically conceivable measurement will never provide the eavesdropper with full
knowledge on the transmission, and will almost certainly disrupt the transmission.
The protocol requires that the sender and the receiver can communicate via an
authenticated2 classical channel, e.g., a phone line. The classical channel can be
assumed public, e.g., wire-tapping is allowed on a phone line.
Since it was first introduced, several variations of and modifications to the BB84
protocol have been proposed. These include, for example, modifying the number
of states allowed to the transmitted particles [8, 9], adjusting the probabilities of
the individual states of the particles [10], transmitting the individual states on more
than one particle [11], and exploiting quantum-mechanical spatial superposition [12].
1Wiesner’s proposition was not, however, published until 1983 [4].
2On an authenticated channel an outsider cannot pose as a legitimate user.
4The so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) protocols offer a different, yet in
many ways equivalent, approach to quantum key distribution [13]. In EPR proto-
cols, the individual particles are not transmitted from sender to receiver but emanate
from a separate source. This source always emits two particles in an entangled state,
one particle for each party of the protocol. Entangled particles exhibit correlations
independent of their spatial distance. These correlations are exploited by the par-
ticipants of the protocol to establish a secret random bit sequence. Once again, it
is possible to detect if anyone has tampered with the source or the particles before
their reception. An authenticated classical channel is needed in this protocol, as
well.
As such, none of the quantum-cryptographic protocols mentioned above provide
the participants with an error-free perfectly secret bit sequence—one that no-one else
has any knowledge of. They rather allow the two parties to share a bit sequence, and
guarantee that no-one else has information on the sequence above some fixed value.
Furthermore, their sequences do not match perfectly because of unavoidable noise
and possible eavesdropping on the transmitted quantum states. A decent amount
of errors can be corrected safely by communication over a public classical chan-
nel. Moreover, the participants may perform privacy amplification: they exchange
further information over the classical channel while shortening their bit sequence,
and thus reduce any eavesdropper’s knowledge of the sequence to an arbitrarily low
value. Hence, the legitimate parties can finally obtain a shared, perfectly secret,
error-free bit sequence.
Above, we discussed how quantum cryptography can be used to send secret ran-
dom bit strings between two parties. What is the value of this capability in terms
of secret communication? Indeed, if they are strictly random, these secret shared
bit sequences provided by the quantum protocols described above can—after error
correction and privacy amplification—be directly used as keys in classical symmetric
cryptography already in everyday use. This essential and non-trivial key-distribution
function is what quantum cryptography in its modern form is most suited for. Hence,
quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution are often used synonymously.
The practical applications of these protocols can safely replace risky public-key-
encrypted key distribution methods.
5Quantum cryptography became reality in 1992, as C. H. Bennett et al. experi-
mentally implemented the BB84 protocol for the first time [14]. The protocol was
completed between parties 30 cm apart—a distance not of much interest in a com-
mercial application. Since the first experimental realization, quantum key distribu-
tion has been succesfully carried out over distances of tens of kilometers [15, 16].
However, quantum cryptography is still plagued by the difficulty of realizing the
protocol over longer distances. Practical applications invariably use photons as the
carrier of the quantum states. Photons may be transported either in optical fibre or
in free space, i.e., earth’s atmosphere. For either choice, the rapid decay of faint light
pulses prohibits secure quantum cryptography over distances above 100 km. [17,18]
In this Master’s Thesis, a novel modification to the BB84 protocol is analyzed.
This modification is outlined as follows: Instead of sending the single particles one-
by-one, they are grouped and a transformation coupling the particles is applied to
each group before transmission. This transformation is assumed to be known by
the sender and receiver, as well as any eavesdropper. After the transformation, the
particles are sent to the intended receiver, but always delaying the transmission until
the receiver has acknowledged receiving the previous particle on the authenticated
classical channel. This restricts eavesdropping to accessing the quantum transmis-
sion one particle at a time. But because a transformation involving a group of
particles was applied, the eavesdropper generally cannot undo that transformation
perfectly. Moreover, even if the eavesdropper was capable of cloning the states of
the individual particles for herself3, she could not clone the state of the entire group
formed by the sender. The legitimate receiver, on the other hand, can undo the
transformation used by the sender because he or she has simultaneous access to
all the particles of a group. Not all quantum transformations involving a group of
particles are such that they cannot be reversed one particle at a time; the trans-
formation has to be non-local. The aim of this Thesis is to find out exactly which
non-local transformation allows the legitimate users of the modified protocol to gain
the maximal advantage over an eavesdropper. Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to
the case where the group size is two particles, i.e., the particles are handled in pairs.
Chapter 2 reviews the concepts and results of classical and quantum information
3In fact, we show in Sec. 2.7 that this is not possible.
6theory needed in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 defines and describes in detail the
aspects of quantum key distribution relevant to our studies. The analysis of the
modified protocol is presented in Ch. 4 which includes the obtained results. Finally,
Ch. 5 concludes this Thesis with a summary and suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2
Classical and Quantum
Information
This chapter presents mathematical tools of classical and quantum information
needed in our studies. The reader is assumed to be familiar with elementary quan-
tum mechanics which will not be discussed here. In the first section, we briefly
review some useful results of probability theory. In Sec. 2.2, we define information-
theoretic entropy and its derivative, mutual information. Entropy is indisputably
the central concept in classical information theory. Mutual information enables us
to give quantitative expression to statements such as: “An adversary has knowledge
on a secret key.” Section 2.3 discusses correcting errors in transmitted data due
to an imperfect channel between two parties. Error correction is accomplished by
exchanging further information about the erroneous data.
The latter part of this chapter discusses topics specific to quantum information.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 introduce the quantum analog of the bit, namely the qubit,
and the properties that most notably distuinguish qubits and classical bits. A short
discussion concerning the physical realizations of a qubit is also included. Section
2.6 reviews means to read existing qubits, i.e., quantum-mechanical measurements.
Finally, copying, or cloning, of quantum information is discussed in Sec. 2.7.
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2.1 Elementary probability theory
The theory of probability can be formulated on the basis of the notion of a ran-
dom variable. A random variable X may assume a number of values, and the
value X has assumed is denoted by x. The probability with which X assumes
the value x, is denoted by p(X = x), which may also be written p(x). If the
possible values X may take are x1, x2, ..., xn, the probability distribution of X is
pX := (p(x1), p(x2), ..., p(xn)) := (p1, p2, ..., pn). Random variables relevant to this
Thesis always take their value from a finite set. The probability that two dis-
tinct random variables X and Y assume values x and y, respectively, is denoted
by p(X = x AND Y = y) or, in short, p(x, y). The probability that X assumes x
or Y assumes y, or both, is denoted by p(X = x OR Y = y). The notation also
generalizes to more than two random variables.
For any two random variables X and Y , and their respective outcomes x and y,
we have
p(X = x OR Y = y) = p(x) + p(y)− p(x, y) . (2.1)
Conditional probability is defined by
p(x|y) := p(x, y)
p(y)
, (2.2)
and gives the probability that X assumes value x, when it is known that Y has
taken value y. When p(y) = 0, we define p(x|y) = 0. When Y has no effect on
the outcome of X , p(x|y) = p(x), and vice versa. Hence, two random variables are
independent if and only if p(x, y) = p(x)p(y). Equation (2.2) implies Bayes’ theorem
which states that
p(x|y) = p(y|x)p(x)
p(y)
. (2.3)
This expression is often amended by writing p(y) in the form given by another direct
consequence of Eq. (2.2), the law of total probability :
p(y) =
∑
x
p(y|x)p(x) . (2.4)
From these equations, the following rules can be derived for random variables A, B,
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and C and their respective outcomes a, b, and c:
p(a|b) =
∑
c
p(a, c|b) , (2.5)
p(a, b|c) = p(a|b, c)p(b|c) , (2.6)
p(a|b, c) = p(b|a, c)p(a|c)
p(b|c) . (2.7)
2.2 Shannon entropy and mutual information
Entropy is described with respect to an information source, or equivalently, a random
variable. Entropy quantifies the average information gain per use of an information
source, or per instance where we let a random variable X assume a value in accor-
dance with its probability distribution pX . Entropy describes our uncertainty of the
random variable before it has assumed its value, or alternatively, how many units of
information we have acquired after we have learned its value. These two views are
equivalent.
The choice for the unit of information is embedded in the definition of entropy.
In this Thesis, the unit of classical information is always a bit. Hence, logarithms
are always taken to base two: log( · ) := log2( · ), unless otherwise stated.
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X with probability distribution
(p1, p2, ..., pn) is defined by
H(X) := H(p1, p2, ..., pn) = −
n∑
j=1
pj log pj . (2.8)
An impossible event should not contribute to entropy, and we therefore define
0 log(0) := 0. Note that entropy achieves its minimum, zero, if one of the prob-
abilities pj = 1. For a given number of possible outcomes n, entropy is maximized if
the probability distribution is flat, i.e., pj =
1
n
for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The maximal
value is logn. The entropy of the simplest random variable that is still meaningful,
one having only two possible outcomes with probabilities p and 1 − p, is known as
binary entropy. Its explicit formula is
Hbin(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) . (2.9)
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To quantify the average combined information gain of the outcomes x and y of
two random variables X and Y , we define the joint entropy by
H(X, Y ) := −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(x, y) . (2.10)
The above equation implies that H(Y,X) = H(X, Y ).
The mutual information of two random variables X and Y describes how much
information they have in common, and is defined by
I(X, Y ) := H(X :Y ) := H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ) . (2.11)
It is clear that I(Y,X) = I(X, Y ). It also holds that I(X, Y ) = 0 if and only if X
and Y are independent. Equation (2.11) can be intuitively justified as follows: The
first two terms, H(X) and H(Y ), represent the information content of X and Y .
Any information common to them is included in both terms, while their individual
information content is included only in the respective term. It follows that common
or joint information is counted twice and non-common information once. Therefore,
the third term, −H(X, Y ), subtracts the individual and common information of the
variables, leaving only their mutual information.
2.3 Error correction of shared data
Consider the following scenario: Two parties, Alice and Bob, share data as a result
of some completed protocol. For simplicity, we assume the data is a string of bits.
The string contains errors, e.g., Alice has 011010 where Bob has 010010, there is
an error in the third bit. Alice and Bob wish to correct all errors by exchanging
further data, disclosing as little information as possible about the string to any other
parties. The theoretical minimum of bits that Alice and Bob have to exchange is
r = n
(− p log p− (1− p) log(1− p)) = nHbin(p) , (2.12)
where n is the length of the string and p is the individual probability of error for each
slot in the string [17]. The result is based on Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem,
for which unfortunately only a non-constructive proof is known [19]. That is, we
know an error-correcting protocol requiring the exchange of only r bits is possible,
but we do not know the details of any such protocol.
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2.3.1 A simple error-correcting protocol
As an example of error correction, we describe a very simple and inefficient error-
correcting protocol. In this context, inefficiency means that parts of the original
data must be discarded, and that the protocol exchanges much more than r bits for
a realistic value of p. The protocol works as follows: Alice randomly chooses pairs
of slots in the string, and sends Bob the slot numbers and her XOR value of the
bits in the two slots. Bob replies with his XOR value of the corresponding bits. If
Alice and Bob’s XOR values match, they keep the bit in the first slot and discard
the second-slot bit. If their XOR value does not match, they discard both bits. The
longer Alice and Bob iterate this procedure, the smaller the probability of an error
in their string becomes. [18]
2.3.2 The Cascade error-correcting protocol
As a second example of error-correction schemes, we review a protocol signifi-
cantly more advanced than that described above. The so-called Cascade protocol,
presented by G. Brassard and L. Salvail, is practical and efficient, preserves the
length of the original data, and nearly achieves the bound in Eq. (2.12) [20]. Let
A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) be Alice’s and B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) Bob’s bit string, where
Aj , Bj ∈ {0, 1}.
In the first pass of the protocol, Alice and Bob choose an integer k1, and group
their strings into blocks of length k1. Both Alice and Bob compute the parity of each
block, i.e., sum up the k1 bits of each block modulo 2. Alice then sends the parities
of her blocks to Bob. When Bob discovers that the parity of one of his blocks, Bl,
differs from Alice’s corresponding parity, Bob knows that there is an odd number
of bit errors in block Bl. Now Alice and Bob initiate the Binary protocol, in which
they interactively and recursively find the erroneous bit in the block. The Binary
protocol works as follows: Alice sends Bob the parity of the first half of the block.
Bob compares this to the parity of the first half of his block. If these parities agree,
the error must be in the second half, and if they disagree, the error is in the first
half. Binary is then applied to the block half containing the error. The recursion
ends and one erroneous bit is corrected, when the block size reaches a small enough
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value. At this point, the first pass is complete, leaving all of Bob’s blocks with either
zero or an even number of bit errors.
In each pass j > 1 Alice and Bob agree on a random shuffling of the bits, and
apply the steps of the first pass to the string, with block size kj . Each time an error
is corrected, there must be previously treated blocks, whose amount of bit errors
just changed from even to odd. Let K denote the set of these blocks. Alice and Bob
apply the Binary protocol to the smallest block in K, and repeat this until all blocks
in K are treated. This ends pass j. The block sizes ki and the number of executed
passes must be optimized so that the probability of any remaining errors is small
enough and at the same time the leakage of information to outsiders is minimal.
The parameters depend on the bit error rate p.
2.4 The unit of quantum information
Classical information is most conveniently stored and manipulated as bits, and,
in classical computer science, the bit is the most commonly used unit of informa-
tion [21]. The bit has a quantum analog, the qubit1, which in turn is the most
widely used unit of quantum information. In principle, any quantum system that
has at least two states can be considered a qubit: Given any multilevel system, two
of its states are simply labeled |0〉 and |1〉, in the Dirac bracket notation. This two-
state subsystem constitutes the qubit. Furthermore, one can make the distinction
between logical and physical qubits. A logical qubit is a mathematical concept, an
aid in the theoretical discussion of quantum information processing, whereas phys-
ical qubits actually span the suitable physical subspaces for logical qubits. In this
Thesis, the word qubit refers to a logical qubit.
2.4.1 Realization of a qubit
D. DiVincenzo has compiled a list of criteria for a particular physical system in order
for it to be useful as a qubit in a functioning quantum computer [22]. This often-
quoted list is known as the DiVincenzo criteria, and it applies in many respects to
1To distinguish a classical bit from a qubit, it is sometimes labeled ’cbit’.
2.4 The unit of quantum information 13
quantum cryptography, as well. The first criterion states that the system should be
scalable and the qubits should be well characterized. That is, the relevant physical
parameters of the qubit should be known, e.g., the internal Hamiltonian, states of
the physical qubit, and couplings external fields. Secondly, it should be possible
to initialize a relevant array of qubits to a known, low-entropy state, e.g., |00...〉.
The third criterion concerns aspects of the protocol presented in this Thesis. It
states that decoherence of qubit states should progress much slower than the unitary
operations, that is, quantum gates2, applied to the qubits. Obviously, computation
is not possible if the information contained in the qubits irreversibly leaks into the
environment between elementary operations. The fourth criterion is related to the
theory of quantum computation. It states that for the proposed realization of the
qubit there should exist a set of quantum gates that is universal, i.e., a set with which
any unitary operation is achievable. Finally, the result of a quantum information
processing task should be attainable: The fifth criterion of DiVincenzo requires the
individual qubits to be measurable with high fidelity.
In addition to the list presented above, DiVincenzo points out two requirements
for successful quantum communication. A realization of the qubit, when used in
communication, must be such that it is possible to convert stationary qubits, used for
local computation or data storage, into flying qubits that are the ones exchanged by
two communicating parties. The conversion from flying to stationary qubits should
also be achievable. There is, of course, no restriction on the flying and stationary
qubits being the same physical system. In addition, it should be possible to transmit
flying qubits between specified locations with a low error rate.
For instance, the polarization of a photon can be treated as a flying qubit. The
vertical polarization, relative to a fixed frame of reference, may be chosen to be the
state |0〉, and the horizontal polarization to be the state |1〉. For further example,
Elliott et al. [23] present a network, in which secure quantum key distribution is
achieved with photons carrying the flying qubits. The authors report an error rate
of 6-8% for the qubits.
2Unitary operations targeted to qubits are called gates in quantum computation. They are the
quantum analogy of logical gates targeted to cbits.
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2.4.2 Superposition
What really distinguishes quantum bits from classical bits, is the possibility of su-
perposition: The qubit may occupy state |0〉, state |1〉, or a linear combination of
these two, which is always of the form
|Q〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 , (2.13)
where the complex numbers α and β satisfy |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 to ensure that the state
is normalized. For α, β 6= 0, the state of the qubit is said to be a superposition of
|0〉 and |1〉.
2.5 Entanglement
Not only single qubits can occupy a superposition state, but any number of qubits
can jointly occupy a superposition state. If this many-qubit superposition state is
inexpressible as a tensor product of individual qubit states, the qubits are said to
occupy an entangled state. Entanglement has no classical analogy, since collections
of classical bits in any state are always expressible by specifying the state of its
components individually, whereas this is not true for collections of quantum bits. For
example, the two-qubit normalized state3 |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |01〉) is not an entangled
state, because it can be decomposed as |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|0〉 ⊗ (|0〉 + |1〉). In contrast, the
state |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) is entangled, as it cannot be written in a tensor-product
form.
Entanglement can be considered as an elementary resource in quantum informa-
tion processing [24, 25], and hence one should be able to express the amount of
entanglement in a given quantum state. However, there is no general agreement on
how to quantify entanglement. As an example of entanglement measures we briefly
review the entanglement of formation for a qubit pair, summarizing the work of W.
K. Wootters [26]. An extensive list of entanglement measures is given, for example,
in Ref. [25].
3Notation: |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ2〉 := |Ψ1〉|Ψ2〉 := |Ψ1Ψ2〉, where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
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2.5.1 Entanglement of formation and concurrence
Suppose a bi-partite quantum system consisting of subsystems A and B is in state
ρ. State ρ has a number of pure-state decompositions {pi, |ψi〉}, for which
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi| . (2.14)
For each pure state |ψi〉〈ψi| of the system, the entanglement of formation is
E(ψi) := −Tr(ρA log ρA) = −Tr(ρB log ρB) , (2.15)
where ρA = TrB(|ψi〉〈ψi|), i.e., the reduced density operator of subsystem A, and
similarly for ρB. Entanglement of formation of ρ is then
E(ρ) := min
∑
i
piE(ψi) , (2.16)
where the minimization is taken over all pure-state decompositions of ρ. To derive
an explicit analytic formula for E, Wootters defines concurrence, another measure
of entanglement, as
C(ψ) := |〈ψ|σ˜y|ψ∗〉| , (2.17)
where σ˜y is the conventional Pauli spin matrix σy, if |ψ〉 is a single-qubit state, and
σ⊗ny , if |ψ〉 is an n-qubit state.
It holds that E(ψ) = E [C(ψ)], where the function E is given by
E(C) = Hbin
(
1 +
√
1− C2
2
)
. (2.18)
It is shown in Ref. [26] that
E(ρ) = E [C(ρ)] , (2.19)
where
C(ρ) = max{0, λ1 − λ2 − λ3 − λ4} , (2.20)
where the λi are the eigenvalues, in decreasing order, of a hermitian matrix R :=√√
ρρ˜
√
ρ, where tilde denotes the operation of complex conjugation followed by
the operation of σ˜y. Both E(ρ) and C(ρ) range from 0 to 1, and are zero for
unentangled states and 1 for maximally entangled states, as is desirable for a measure
of entanglement.
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2.6 Quantum measurement
To fully specify an arbitrary state of a qubit, an infinite amount of information, in
general, is needed: One has to announce the precise values of the complex numbers
α and β in Eq. (2.13). However, due to the nature of quantum measurements, only
a finite amount of information can ever be extracted from a qubit. Hence, the exact
values of α and β of an unknown qubit state can never be learned with certainty.
The formalism of quantum measurements defines how much information can be
gained on an array of qubits, with a specific measurement scheme. It should be
noted that, in quantum mechanics, measurements are the only way of acquiring
knowledge on a previously unknown physical system. In the course of our analy-
sis, we employ two kinds of measurements: projective and positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) measurements.
2.6.1 Projective measurements
Projective measurements are described in any reasonable introduction to quantum
mechanics. Therefore, only a short definition is presented here. A projective mea-
surement has a corresponding observable M , which has a decomposition
M =
∑
m
mPm , (2.21)
where {Pm} are orthogonal projection operators to the eigenspaces with respective
eigenvalues {m}. The eigenvalues are the possible outcomes upon measuring the
observable M . If a state |ψ〉 is measured, the probability of outcome m is
p(m) = 〈ψ|Pm|ψ〉 . (2.22)
Immediately after the measurement yielding m, the state of the system collapses to
Pm|ψ〉√
p(m)
. (2.23)
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2.6.2 Positive operator-valued measures
Projective measurements are in general suitable for situations where there is interest
in the evolution of the quantum system after the measurement. The converse is true
for the POVM formalism which is more general than that of projective measure-
ments, but still well suited for describing the probabilities of different outcomes.
Suppose there is a set of positive operators4 {Em} such that∑
m
Em = I . (2.24)
Then the set {Em} is a POVM, and the operatorsEm are known as the corresponding
POVM elements. The measurement that the POVM describes yields outcome m for
state |ψ〉 with probability
p(m) = 〈ψ|Em|ψ〉 . (2.25)
For example, any projective measurement can be described with a POVM: The
POVM elements are the projectors of the projective measurement, Em = Pm. In
general however, POVM elements need not be projectors. Hence, POVMs clearly
describe a larger class of measurements than projective measurements alone.
Another example, adopted from Ref. [24], presents a measurement scheme with
which one can possibly distinguish between states |ϕ1〉 = |0〉 and |ϕ2〉 = 1√2(|0〉+|1〉),
and never make an error of identifying state |ϕ1〉 as |ϕ2〉, or vice versa. Note that this
characteristic cannot be achieved using only projective measurements. The POVM
implementing this measurement scheme is
E1 =
√
2
1 +
√
2
|1〉〈1| , (2.26)
E2 =
√
2
2(1 +
√
2)
(|0〉 − |1〉)(〈0| − 〈1|) , (2.27)
E3 = I −E1 − E2 . (2.28)
Now, suppose we measure a given state using the POVM {E1, E2, E3}, knowing that
the state is either |ϕ1〉 or |ϕ2〉. If the measurement yields 1, we know that the given
state was |ϕ2〉. Similarly, result 2 implies that the state was |ϕ1〉.
4A positive operator A : H→ H is such that 〈v|A|v〉 is real and non-negative for any |v〉 ∈ H.
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2.7 Quantum cloning
2.7.1 The no-cloning theorem
Unlike classical information, quantum information, in general, cannot be copied
perfectly. This is due to the no-cloning property of quantum mechanics, stated as
the no-cloning theorem: It is not possible to produce perfect copies of an unknown
quantum state. Applied to qubits, the theorem states that given a qubit in state
|Q〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉, we cannot produce the state |Q〉⊗|Q〉 without knowing the values
of α and β. The theorem does not state that we cannot produce a number of similar
states |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ〉, only that given a system in state |ψ〉 with no
additional information, we cannot create state |Ψ〉.
Let us give an elementary proof of the theorem, using reductio ad absurdum. The
evolution of any quantum system can be described as unitary by appending an
auxiliary system, or ancilla, to the original system. Now, suppose that a flawless
copier exists. The copier has two slots, labelled S1 and S2, and an ancilla. The
ancilla may be of any dimension. Slot S1 occupies state |ψ〉 representing the source,
i.e., the state we wish to reproduce. Slot S2 is the target slot, which is to occupy the
source state |ψ〉 after the copying process. Slot S2 starts out in some initial state,
denoted by |s0〉. The initial state of the ancilla is |A0〉. That is, the initial state of
the copying machine is
|ψ〉 ⊗ |s0〉 ⊗ |A0〉 . (2.29)
The copying process, which can be assumed unitary, and is also assumed to leave
the source and target states and the ancilla unentangled, is denoted by Uc, and it
clones the state in S1 as [27]
Uc(|ψ〉|s0〉|A0〉) = |ψ〉|ψ〉|Aψ〉 . (2.30)
The ancilla is left in state |Aψ〉 that possibly depends on |ψ〉. The same must hold
for copying the state |φ〉 6= |ψ〉:
Uc(|φ〉|s0〉|A0〉) = |φ〉|φ〉|Aφ〉 , (2.31)
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and for the superposition state |Σ〉 = 1√
2
(|φ〉+ |ψ〉):
Uc(|Σ〉|s0〉|A0〉) = |Σ〉|Σ〉|AΣ〉
=
1
2
(|φ〉+ |ψ〉)(|φ〉+ |ψ〉)|AΣ〉
=
1
2
(|φ〉|φ〉+ |φ〉|ψ〉+ |ψ〉|φ〉+ |ψ〉|ψ〉)|AΣ〉 . (2.32)
But because of linearity of quantum mechanics
Uc(|Σ〉|s0〉|A0〉) = 1√
2
(
Uc(|φ〉|s0〉|A0〉) + Uc(|ψ〉|s0〉|A0〉)
)
=
1√
2
(|φ〉|φ〉|Aφ〉+ |ψ〉|ψ〉|Aψ〉) , (2.33)
which is clearly not compatible with Eq. (2.32), even if there were no ancilla in the
copier. Hence, the assumption of the existence of a perfect cloning machine must
be false.
2.7.2 Optimal cloning
We have shown that perfect cloning of quantum states is not possible. However,
one can produce imperfect copies that are close to the original state with respect
to some measure of cloning quality. Let us summarize the results on best possible
discrete-system quantum cloning presented in Ref. [27]. Scarani et al. define N →M
cloning of pure states as
(|ψ〉⊗N)⊗ (|s0〉⊗(M−N))⊗ |A0〉 U→ |Ψ〉 (2.34)
where we continue the use of notation presented in Sec. 2.7.1, and U is the unitary
cloning process. The quality of the produced copies is measured as fidelity F , which
is defined
Fj := 〈ψ|ρj|ψ〉 , j ∈ {1, ...,M} , (2.35)
where ρj is the density operator of the partial state of clone j in |Ψ〉. For a universal
copier, Fj is independent of the source state |ψ〉. For a symmetric copier, Fj is
independent of j. A copier is optimal if it produces copies with maximal fidelity
allowed by quantum physics, for a given source-state fidelity. The fidelity to be
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maximized can be the average fidelity F¯ :=
∫
S dψF (ψ), or the minimum of fidelities
Fmin := minψ∈S F (ψ), where S is the set of source states.
The first quantum copying machine was presented by V. Buzˇek and M. Hillery in
1996 [28]. Their quantum copier is a universal, symmetric, optimal 1 → 2 copier
capable of duplicating a qubit, and achieving a fidelity of 5
6
. This generalizes to the
universal, symmetric, optimal N → M cloner for systems of any dimension d (not
only for qubits, where d = 2), whose fidelity is
FN→Md =
N
M
+
(M −N)(N + 1)
M(N + d)
, (2.36)
a result by R. F. Werner [29].
In asymmetric cloning, the produced copies have different fidelities. For example,
the universal, asymmetric, optimal 1→ 2 qubit-copying machine produces copies A
and B, whose fidelities are
FA = 1− b
2
2
and FB = 1− a
2
2
, (2.37)
where the real parameters a and b satisfy a2 + b2 + ab = 1. This result was found
independently by several groups [27, 30, 31].
Again, the above mentioned qubit copier generalizes to the universal, asymmetric,
optimal 1 → 2 cloner capable of copying systems of dimension d, described in
Refs. [32, 33]. Optimality was, however, proven later [34, 35]. The fidelities of the
output systems of the cloner are
FA = 1− d− 1
d
b2 and FB = 1− d− 1
d
a2 , (2.38)
where the real parameters a and b now satisfy a2 + b2 + ab
d
= 1.
Finally, we review the fidelity of a non-universal, i.e., state-dependent, 1 → 2
qubit cloner, which is in addition phase covariant. In this context, phase covariance
means that the cloner can clone, at best, states of the form
|Ψ(ϕ)〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ eiϕ|1〉) . (2.39)
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The cloner, discussed in Ref. [36], transforms input states as
|0〉|0〉 → |0〉|0〉
|1〉|0〉 → cos(η)|1〉|0〉+ sin(η)|0〉|1〉 , (2.40)
where η ∈ [0, pi
2
]. Applying this to the state in Eq. (2.39) yields
|Ψ(ϕ)〉|0〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ cos(η)eiϕ|1〉|0〉+ sin(η)eiϕ|0〉|1〉) , (2.41)
from which one obtains the fidelities
FA =
1
2
(1 + cos η) and FB =
1
2
(1 + sin η) . (2.42)
Note that these fidelities are independent of the phase factor ϕ.
Chapter 3
Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) refers to any scheme that allows two distant par-
ties to securely establish a shared, secret string of bits, and in which the security is
based on the laws of quantum physics. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard were the first
to propose a practical protocol for QKD [7], known as the BB84 protocol. Section
3.1 describes the protocol in detail. The first experimental realization of the protocol
is described in Ref. [14]. During the last two decades, the scientific community has
introduced an overwhelming amount of modifications to the BB84 protocol, as well
as entirely new QKD protocols [8–13, 37–61]. Some of these are briefly reviewed in
Sec. 3.2.
Let us introduce the customary terminology of quantum cryptography. The ini-
titator of the communication is Alice, and the party to whom Alice wants to send
her messages is Bob. The all-purpose malevolent party who wishes to spy on Alice’s
and Bob’s communication is Eve, the eavesdropper. If Alice or Bob co-operate with
a non-malicious third party, he is called Charlie. A channel allows Alice and Bob to
send data to each other. A channel can be one-way or two-way. A classical channel
transmits bits, and a quantum channel transmits qubits. A public channel is one
that anyone can listen to and to which anyone can send messages. If Alice and
Bob use an authenticated channel, Eve cannot send messages such that they would
appear to Bob to be from Alice, or vice versa. When considering the security of
a particular cryptographic scheme, Eve is granted various capabilities. The set of
Eve’s capabilities together with her actions during the execution of a protocol de-
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fines an attack. Section 3.1.5 describes attacks against the BB84 protocol. Section
3.2 summarizes attacks against other protocols.
3.1 BB84 protocol
Figure 3.1 shows a schematic illustration of the BB84 protocol. Alice and Bob are
in possession of a two-way public authenticated classical channel. They also have
a one-way public quantum channel, which allows Alice to send individual qubits to
Bob. Eve is allowed total control of the quantum channel. That is, she can delete
and insert transmissions, as well as alter them in any way that is not forbidden by
the laws of quantum mechanics. Eve’s interaction with the channel is denoted by
E. In addition, Eve is assumed to listen in on every transmission on the classical
channel. In the following description, we first assume no participation on Eve’s
behalf, and postpone the discussion of the effects introduced by Eve’s interference
to Sec. 3.1.5. Likewise, the discussion of an imperfect quantum channel is postponed
to Sec. 3.1.4, and for now, both channels are assumed ideal, i.e., error-free. There is
no Charlie in this protocol, that is, Alice and Bob do not have to rely on any third
party to complete the key distribution.
Figure 3.1: Setup of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. Alice and Bob use
a two-way classical channel and a one-way quantum channel. Eve has total control
over the quantum channel, whereas she can only listen to the classical channel.
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3.1.1 Transmission
When Alice and Bob have decided, e.g., using the classical channel, to initiate the
protocol, Alice begins the transmission of individual particles on the quantum chan-
nel. In the original paper, these particles are photons [7], and hence we will describe
the protocol with photon transmission. However, any quantum system qualifying
as a flying qubit1 with two maximally conjugate bases would serve. Each of Alice’s
photons randomly occupy one of four possible states. Each state corresponds to a
direction of linear polarization of the photon.
The choice of the state of each photon can be considered to consist of two bi-
nary random variables. The actual physical systems corresponding to these random
variables are in Alice’s possession. The first random variable A′ represents the can-
didate for the bit value that Alice is trying to send to Bob. It is essential that
p(A′ = 0) = p(A′ = 1) = 1
2
. Alice records for herself the outcomes of A′. The second
random variable PA determines in which basis the output of A
′ is transmitted. For
PA as well, we have to have p(PA = z) = p(PA = x) =
1
2
.
If PA = z, Alice encodes the outcome 0 of A
′ as vertical polarization of the
photon, and the outcome 1 as horizontal polarization of the photon. The vertical
and horizontal polarization states are denoted by |l 〉 and |↔〉, respectively. Photons
transmitted in either of these states are said to be sent in the ⊕ basis. If PA = x,
Alice uses a diagonal basis: The outcome 0 of A′ is encoded as the 45◦ rotated
linear polarization, vertical being the non-rotated direction of polarization, and the
outcome 1 of A′ as the 135◦ rotated linear polarization. The respective states are
denoted by |րւ〉 and |ցտ〉. This is known as the ⊗ basis.
The photon transmission states and bases can be equivalently described using the
spin formalism of quantum mechanics. If PA = z, Alice transmits in the eigenbasis
of the Pauli spin matrix σz: The outcome 0 of A
′ is sent as |0〉, or equivalently as the
spin-up state |↑〉, and the outcome 1 as |1〉, equivalent to the spin-down state |↓〉. If
PA = x, Alice transmits in the eigenbasis of the Pauli spin matrix σx: The outcome
0 of A′ is sent as |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), and the outcome 1 as |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). In
summary, |0〉 = | l 〉, |1〉 = |↔〉, |+〉 = |րւ〉, |−〉 = |ցտ〉, and basis ⊕ corresponds
1See Sec. 2.4.1.
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to the σz eigenbasis and basis ⊗ to the σx eigenbasis—hence the labels z and x for
the outcomes of PA. The z and x bases are maximally conjugate in the sense that
for any pair of states chosen from different bases, the square modulus of the inner
product is |〈0|+〉|2 = |〈0|−〉|2 = . . . = 1
2
.
3.1.2 Measurement
Upon reception, Bob measures the polarization of each arriving photon. Bob’s
particular measurement is defined by a random variable PB, whose physical system
Bob is in total control of. The random variable PB is identical to PA in the sense
that p(PB = z) = p(PB = x) =
1
2
but totally independent of PA. If PA and PB
were to depend on each other in some way, Alice and Bob would have to exchange
information as PA and PB assume their values. This cannot be allowed, as it would
severely compromise the security of the protocol. Therefore, it is required that PA
and PB are independent.
Bob chooses the basis for his measurement of the direction of polarization in the
same way that Alice chooses her basis of transmission. If PB = z, Bob measures in
σz eigenbasis, and if PB = x, he measures in σx eigenbasis. Bob uses a projective
measurement for each basis choice. For the z basis, the measurement projectors
are P z0 = |0〉〈0| and P z1 = |1〉〈1|. For the x basis, Bob uses P x0 = |+〉〈+| and
P x1 = |−〉〈−|. For example, in the x basis, when A′ = 0, Bob recovers this with
probability
p(0) = 〈+|P x0 |+〉 = 〈+|+〉〈+|+〉 = |〈+|+〉|2 = 1 . (3.1)
We observe that whenever the bases chosen by Alice and Bob coincide, Bob exactly
recovers the value of Alice’s random variable A′. This happens with probability
p(PA = PB = z OR PA = PB = x)
= p(PA = z, PB = z) + p(PA = x, PB = x)
= p(PA = z)p(PB = z) + p(PA = x)p(PB = x)
=
1
2
, (3.2)
where we have used Eq. (2.1), the fact that only one basis is defined for Alice and
Bob at a time, and the independence of PA and PB.
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From Eq. (3.2), it follows that Bob uses a basis incompatible with Alice’s basis
with probability 1
2
. When this happens, Bob cannot recover the value of A′. For
instance, if Alice has transmitted |+〉 and Bob measures this in the wrong basis,
p(0) = 〈+|P z0 |+〉 =
1
2
(〈0|+ 〈1|)|0〉〈0|(|0〉+ |1〉) = 1
2
〈0|0〉 = 1
2
. (3.3)
In fact, the same probability is obtained for each result and for each photon state
given that Bob chooses the wrong basis for his measurement. That is, when the
bases are not compatible, Bob gets the two possible results with equal probability.
3.1.3 Basis reconciliation
After each measurement, Bob interprets results |0〉 and |+〉 as 0, and results |1〉
and |−〉 as 1, and records this interpretation for himself. Bob’s sequence of inter-
pretations from the individual polarization measurements is known as the raw key.
Because Alice and Bob choose the same bases with probability 1
2
, in the limit of a
long key, only half of the bits in Bob’s raw key are definitely the same as the output
of A′ recorded by Alice. For the measurements where Alice’s and Bob’s bases do
not coincide, the result is, by chance, correct half the time, so on average half of this
half of the raw-key bits agree. Since this is as good as Bob having simply guessed
the values without any measurement, these bits have no value in this protocol, and
Bob should discard them.
To be able to decide which bits to discard, Bob sends the sequence of his basis
choices, i.e., outcomes of PB, to Alice through the classical channel. Alice replies,
through the classical channel, with her basis choices, i.e., outcomes of PA. This is
called basis reconciliation: Alice and Bob compare their basis-choice sequences, and
discard all the bits where Bob used the wrong basis. That is, Alice and Bob keep
only those bits for which their bases happened to coincide. What is left is an error-
free shared string of bits known as the sifted key. Thus the protocol has achieved
its goal. Table 3.1 presents an example of the use of this protocol.
For later purposes, it is convinient to model also the result of Bob’s measurement,
given that he used the same basis as Alice, as a random variable. Thus the outcomes
of this random variable B determine the bits in Bob’s sifted key. We define a
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Table 3.1: A brief example of the BB84 QKD protocol. This example assumes
error-free channels and no interference by Eve. Alice sends the photons in the state
determined by her key-candidate and transmission-basis random variables. Bob
measures the state of the photons in a randomly chosen basis, shown on line 5, and
records his results (line 6). After the photon transmission is complete, Alice and
Bob compare their basis choices and discard the bits for which their bases did not
match. The remaining bits are shown on line 8. Finally, Alice and Bob choose
randomly which bits to compare publicly (line 9), in order to estimate the quantum
bit error rate of the transmission, described in Sec. 3.1.4.
1 Transmission 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
2 A′ 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
3 PA z x x z z z x z x z
4 Alice sends |1〉 |+〉 |−〉 |1〉 |0〉 |1〉 |−〉 |0〉 |+〉 |1〉
5 PB x z x x z z z z x x
6 Raw key 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
7 PA = PB no no yes no yes yes no yes yes no
8 Sifted key 1 0 1 0 0
9 Error estim. no no yes no yes
10 Key 1 0 0
similar random variable for Alice: Outcomes of random variable A determine the
bit values in Alice’s sifted key, i.e., in the bit sequence in Alice’s possession after
basis reconciliation. The outcomes of A are a subset of the outcomes of A′. Bob’s
random variable B is, of course, highly dependent on A. For now, we state
p(B = 0|A = 0) = p(B = 1|A = 1) = 1 (3.4)
p(B = 0|A = 1) = p(B = 1|A = 0) = 0 . (3.5)
These equations cease to hold if the assumption of non-interfering Eve is relaxed, or
if the quantum channel is allowed a finite error rate.
3.1.4 Issues introduced by non-ideal equipment
The technology Alice and Bob use to implement a QKD protocol is never perfect.
This section reviews the most important implications of the use of non-ideal equip-
ment for the BB84 protocol. Firstly, the quantum channel conveying quantum states
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from Alice to Bob is not perfect. Alice’s transmission may be totally lost, or its po-
larization may be randomly rotated by a small angle. A lossy quantum channel
poses no fundamental problem for Alice and Bob, as they can agree that Alice uses
the classical channel to tell Bob when she transmits, and that Bob tells Alice which
transmissions were succesfully received. A quantum channel that randomly rotates
the polarization of the photons causes errors to the sifted key, which means that
Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) do not hold anymore. The probability that Bob’s measurement
yields an incorrect result, even if he uses the same basis as Alice, is coined quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER). That is, assuming an error process independent of the
direction of polarization, p(B = 0|A = 1) = p(B = 1|A = 0) = QBER. Alice and
Bob can obtain an estimate of the QBER by publicly comparing the values of a
fraction of their respective sifted keys. Subsequently, they have to discard the bits
whose values have been announced in public. Table 3.1 presents an example of this
step. Working BB84-based QKD schemes have been reported with a QBER ranging
from 1.0% to 10.2% [16, 62–64]. Errors in the sifted key can be corrected using
classical error correction procedures with communication over the classical channel,
described in Sec. 2.3.
Secondly, Bob’s detectors are imperfect: Sometimes a detector fails to register
a photon, and sometimes it incorrectly reports to have received a photon when in
reality no transmission was received. Reports of the latter type are known as dark
counts. Both of these effects can be counteracted with the same technique that was
used to deal with a lossy channel: Alice and Bob declare their transmissions and
receptions over the classical channel. Subsequently, Alice discards bits lost in the
quantum channel or Bob’s detector, and Bob discards excess bits created by dark
counts. The rare event where a photon sent by Alice was lost in the channel, but
Bob still observes a reception because of a dark count, contributes to the QBER. For
instance, the following figures have been observed achievable in QKD experiments.
A. Muller et al. have implemented the original BB84 protocol using photon polar-
ization, reporting a detector efficiency of 0.2% and a dark count rate of 700 s−1, with
1.1·106 s−1 transmission rate at Alice’s end [16], T. Hirano et al. have implemented
a BB84 variant with detector efficiencies near 80% [63], and L. P. Lamoureux et
al. report a 10.5% detector efficiency in a quantum coin-tossing protocol [65].
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There are also several technical issues affecting the security of an implementation.
One of the most serious problems is due to the fact that the BB84 protocol assumes
that Alice can send individual photons to Bob. In reality, however, reliably creating
transmissions containing exactly one photon is very difficult. Usually, single-photon
pulses for QKD are created with an attenuated laser, for which the number of pho-
tons per pulse is a Poisson-distributed random variable [17]. Thus some of the
pulses do not contain a photon at all, and some pulses contain one, two, or even
more photons. Pulses containing more than one photon compromise the security of
the protocol, since Eve can mount a specific attack based on multi-photon trans-
missions [66]. Therefore, the probability of transmitting more than one photon per
transmission should be very small. Consequently, the probability of transmitting at
least one photon tends to be quite small, as well. In Ref. [17], A. Ekert et al. present
the following figures: The usual source used in QKD emits, on average, 0.1 photons
per pulse, and 5% of the pulses that contain at least one photon, contain more than
one photon. The authors anticipate that these figures will improve as technology
advances. For instance, B. Darquie´ et al. reported in 2005 an experiment with
a triggered source emitting single right-circularly polarized2 photons [67]. Pulses
from this source contain one photon with probability 0.981, and two photons with
probability 0.019.
The implementation of the quantum channel of the protocol, including the detec-
tors of Alice and Bob, may offer Eve the possibility of a trojan horse attack. In this
type of attack, for example, Eve sends pulses of light to the quantum channel and
observes the pattern of light reflected back from Alice’s and Bob’s equipment [18].
This way, Eve can, in principle, acquire information on the bases used by Alice and
Bob, on the last value of Alice’s key candidate variable A, or on the result of Bob’s
last measurement. Secure measures exist to thwart the trojan horse attack [68].
3.1.5 Attacks
In this section, we discuss attacks on the ideal BB84 protocol. That is, we abide
by the framework presented in Fig. 3.1 and assume that Alice and Bob have taken
2Circular as well as linear polarization states can be used directly in BB84 [18].
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all necessary precautions to counteract any security threats introduced by non-ideal
equipment. Furthermore, Eve does not have access to Alice’s or Bob’s office, e.g.,
she cannot use a telescope to watch Bob’s display. To recapitulate, Eve can only:
i) Freely tamper with the quantum channel.
ii) Listen in on everything that is transmitted on the classical channel.
A characteristic feature of quantum key distribution schemes is that any known
method of eavesdropping inevitably causes errors to the quantum transmission, in-
creasing the QBER. The errors allow Alice and Bob to detect Eve’s interference and
to obtain an estimate on Eve’s maximal information about the key. In BB84, the
QBER is the only, albeit guaranteed, indicator of Eve’s interference. As described
in Sec. 3.1.4, an error estimate is obtained by publicly comparing random bits in the
sifted key. The accuracy of the estimate can be made arbitrarily high by increasing
the number of compared bit values. An example of the estimation is included in
Table 3.1. Alice and Bob have no way of resolving which errors are due to an imper-
fect quantum channel and which are due to Eve’s actions, and they therefore safely
assume that the estimated QBER is in its entirety due to Eve. After all, Eve could
have, in principle, replaced most of the noisy quantum channel with a less noisy
one. Alice and Bob correct errors of either origin using a classical error correction
protocol.
Considering what Eve should do to gain knowledge on Alice and Bob’s key, per-
haps the first tactics that would come to one’s mind is that Eve would capture each
of Alice’s qubit transmissions, prepare a copy of each for herself, and send another
copy to Bob. Note that Eve has to send something to Bob, to allow him to continue
the protocol—otherwise the transmission would never result in a key. Eve could
keep her copies intact until Alice and Bob publicly announce their basis choices,
and measure each transmission in the correct basis. She would then obtain a flaw-
less copy of the key that Alice and Bob established without them knowing of this at
all. However, this is where quantum physics steps in: According to the no-cloning
theorem (Sec. 2.7.1), Eve cannot make perfect copies of all the states transmitted
in the protocol. Therefore, this type of attack is simply not possible. However, if
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Eve settles for flawed copies, the attack is feasible and considerable. This imperfect
cloning attack is equivalent to an incoherent attack, discussed below.
Intercept-resend
In the intercept-resend (IR) attack, Eve individually intercepts each qubit sent by
Alice, measures the qubit state, and resends to Bob a qubit in the state correspond-
ing to her measurement result. Eve performs her measurements exactly like Bob:
For each qubit, she chooses at random between the two measurement bases: eigen-
basis of σz or eigenbasis of σx. Alternatively, Eve can use the same basis every
time. This does not affect the analysis, since Alice always transmits in a randomly
chosen basis. If Eve uses the z basis in a measurement, result 0 means that Eve
sends |0〉, and result 1 that she sends |1〉 to Bob. If Eve’s measurement basis is x,
she resends |+〉 if the result is 0, and |−〉 if the result is 1. Note that, on average,
Eve inevitably chooses the wrong basis with probability 1
2
. Thus, Eve’s interfer-
ence increases the QBER, based on which Alice and Bob estimate Eve’s maximal
information on Alice’s sifted key, i.e., the outcomes of the random variable A.
Let us calculate exactly how much information, on average, the IR attack maxi-
mally provides Eve as a function of QBER. To verify that Eve indeed chooses the
wrong basis with probability half, consider the two cases: Eve uses the same basis
every time, or Eve chooses her basis randomly and uniformly. In the first case,
because Alice’s transmission basis is half the time z and half the time x, either fixed
basis leads to Eve’s choice being wrong on average half the time. As for the second
case, let PE denote Eve’s measurement basis: p(PE = z) = p(PE = x) =
1
2
. The
probability that Eve’s choice is compatible with Alice’s is
p(PA = PE = z OR PA = PE = x)
= p(PA = z, PE = z) + p(PA = x, PE = x)
= p(PA = z)p(PE = z) + p(PA = x)p(PE = x)
=
1
2
, (3.6)
exactly like in Eq. (3.2), and thus the choice is wrong half the time. Of course, Eve
could favor, say, the z basis so that p(PE = z) = 1 − p(PE = x) > 12 . This strategy
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does not change the probability obtained above, since it is equivalent to using a
fixed choice some of the time, and a random choice with uniform probabilities some
of the time. The probability of choosing wrong is 1
2
for both and thus Eve cannot
increase, or decrease, the probability of her basis being the same as Alice’s basis.
The knowledge that Eve has on Alice’s bit sequence after basis reconciliation,
i.e., outcomes of A, is quantified as the mutual information I(A,E), where E is a
random variable denoting the outcome of each of Eve’s measurements. However,
E only models measurements which correspond to transmissions that contribute to
the sifted key. This is sensible because the basis reconciliation phase is public and
thus Eve knows which bits Alice and Bob discard. According to Eq. (2.11),
I(A,E) = H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E) . (3.7)
The entropy of Alice’s random variable A is
H(A) = −
1∑
a=0
p(a) log p(a) = Hbin
(1
2
)
= 1 . (3.8)
To be able to express H(E), we need to calculate the probability distribution of E,
i.e., values p(E = 0) and p(E = 1). Since p(E = 1) = 1 − p(E = 0), it is sufficient
to determine p(E = 0). Eve can obtain the result E = 0 in two mutually exclusive
cases: Eve has the wrong basis, or Eve has the correct basis, compared to Alice’s
basis. Let Bw and Bc denote these events, respectively. In accordance with the law
of total probability, Eq. (2.4), we have
p(E = 0) = p(E = 0|Bw)p(Bw) + p(E = 0|Bc)p(Bc)
=
1
2
[p(E = 0|Bw) + p(E = 0|Bc)] . (3.9)
The case where Eve chooses the correct basis is straightforward to analyze: Alice’s
transmission is in a state that already lies in the subspace of Eve’s measurement
projectors. For example,
p(E = 0, PE = x|A = 0, PA = x) = 〈+|P x0 |+〉 = 〈+|+〉〈+|+〉 = 1 . (3.10)
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Hence, Eve always correctly obtains the outcome of A, and we get
p(E = 0|Bc) (2.5)=
∑
a
p(E = 0, a|Bc)
(2.6)
=
∑
a
p(E = 0|a, Bc)p(a|Bc)
=
∑
a
p(E = 0|a, Bc)p(a)
=
1
2
[p(E = 0|A = 0, Bc) + p(E = 0|A = 1, Bc)]
=
1
2
(1 + 0)
=
1
2
, (3.11)
where a is the outcome of A, and we have used the fact that Alice’s and Eve’s basis
choices are independent of A.
As for Eve’s wrong choice of basis, the incorrect choice can be made in exactly
two ways: by choosing the z basis, or by choosing the x basis. Furthermore, in
each of these cases, Alice may have sent either 0 or 1. These four cases each yield
probability 1
2
for E = 0, which can be observed by calculating
p(E = 0, PE = z|A = 0, PA = x) = 〈+|P z0 |+〉 = 〈+|0〉〈0|+〉 = |〈+|0〉|2 =
1
2
(3.12)
p(E = 0, PE = x|A = 0, PA = z) = 〈0|P x0 |0〉 = 〈0|+〉〈+|0〉 = |〈+|0〉|2 =
1
2
,
(3.13)
and similarly for the cases where A = 1. Thus, p(E = 0|Bw) = 12 , and we have
p(E = 0) = p(E = 1) = 1
2
or in short p(e) = 1
2
, from which we finally obtain the
entropy of Eve’s measurement outcome
H(E) = −
1∑
e=0
p(e) log p(e) = Hbin
(1
2
)
= 1 . (3.14)
To calculate the third term in Eq. (3.7), H(A,E), we treat the cases of correct
and incorrect basis separately, and use their average as the joint entropy H(A,E).
The use of an average is justified by noting that all the quantities related to Eve’s
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knowledge about the key are averaged over a large set of transmissions from Alice
to Bob. That is, we are dealing with probabilities. Using the definitions of joint
entropy, Eq. (2.10), and conditional probability, Eq. (2.2), we expand
H(A,E) = −
∑
a,e
p(a, e) log p(a, e)
= −
∑
a,e
p(e|a)p(a) log[p(e|a)p(a)]
= −1
2
∑
a,e
p(e|a) log
[1
2
p(e|a)
]
=
1
2
∑
a,e
p(e|a)− 1
2
∑
a,e
p(e|a) log p(e|a) . (3.15)
We have already calculated the probabilities p(e|a). If Eve chooses her basis cor-
rectly, p(0|0) = p(1|1) = 1 and p(0|1) = p(1|0) = 0. Thus the joint entropy in the
case of correct basis is 1. When Eve chooses the wrong basis, p(0|0) = p(0|1) =
p(1|0) = p(1|1) = 1
2
. Thus the joint entropy for an incorrect basis choice is 2. Be-
cause Eve’s basis choice is correct on average half the time, H(A,E) = 3
2
. Applying
the results to Eq. (3.7) gives I(A,E) = 1
2
. That is, Eve gains 0.5 bits of information
per bit in the sifted key.
The results are very intuitive. When Eve’s basis is correct, E gives exactly the
same information as A without error. When Eve’s basis is incorrect, she gets results
that are totally random, and E conveys no information on A. The correct basis is
used with probability 1
2
, i.e., half the time in a large set of interceptions. Therefore,
Eve gets half of the bits in Alice’s sifted key, and the rest is random noise.
There is an alternative and somewhat simpler formulation for Eve’s knowledge
on the sifted key, which we will later use in our analysis. One defines a composite
random variable A˜ for the joint outcome of A and PA. That is, A˜ describes the quan-
tum state of Alice’s transmission, and assumes its values a˜ from the set {0, 1,+,−}
with uniform probability p(a˜) = 1
4
. In the following, we prove that calculating Eve’s
information on the transmission state A˜ yields exactly the same result as calculating
her information on A, i.e., I(A˜, E) = I(A,E).
The mutual information of A˜ and E is
I(A˜, E) = H(A˜) +H(E)−H(A˜, E) , (3.16)
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where H(E) = 1, as before, and
H(A˜) = −
−∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) log p(a˜)
= −
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) log p(a˜)−
−∑
a˜=+
p(a˜) log p(a˜)
= −2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) log p(a˜) . (3.17)
Noting that p(a) = 2p(a˜) for a, a˜ ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain
H(A) = −
1∑
a=0
p(a) log p(a)
= −2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) log [2p(a˜)]
= −2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)− 2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) log p(a˜)
= −2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) +H(A˜) . (3.18)
Now let us expand the joint entropy of A˜ and E to ultimately show that the difference
in the entropies of A˜ and A is exactly cancelled by the same difference in the joint
entropies. The joint entropy is the average of joint entropies of Eve’s different basis
choices, Hz(A˜, E) and Hx(A˜, E), which are in fact equal. That is,
H(A˜, E) =
1
2
Hz(A˜, E) +
1
2
Hx(A˜, E)
= −1
2
1∑
e=0
−∑
a˜=0
p(e|a˜, PE = z)p(a˜) log[p(e|a˜, PE = z)p(a˜)]
−1
2
1∑
e=0
−∑
a˜=0
p(e|a˜, PE = x)p(a˜) log[p(e|a˜, PE = x)p(a˜)]
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= −1
2
1∑
e=0
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)
{
[p(e|a˜, PE = z) + p(e|a˜, PE = x)] log p(a˜)
+p(e|a˜, PE = z) log p(e|a˜, PE = z) + p(e|a˜, PE = x) log p(e|a˜, PE = x)
}
−1
2
1∑
e=0
−∑
a˜=+
p(a˜)
{
[p(e|a˜, PE = z) + p(e|a˜, PE = x)] log p(a˜)
+p(e|a˜, PE = z) log p(e|a˜, PE = z) + p(e|a˜, PE = x) log p(e|a˜, PE = x)
}
= −1
2
1∑
e=0
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)
{
[p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw)] log p(a˜)
+p(e|a˜, Bc) log p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw) log p(e|a˜, Bw)
}
−1
2
1∑
e=0
−∑
a˜=+
p(a˜)
{
[p(e|a˜, Bw) + p(e|a˜, Bc)] log p(a˜)
+p(e|a˜, Bw) log p(e|a˜, Bw) + p(e|a˜, Bc) log p(e|a˜, Bc)
}
= −
1∑
e=0
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)
{
[p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw)] log p(a˜)
+p(e|a˜, Bc) log p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw) log p(e|a˜, Bw)
}
, (3.19)
where we have used the fact that the z basis is correct for a˜ = 0, 1 and incorrect for
a˜ = +,−, and conversely for the x basis. The last equality follows from the equality
of the sums over a˜.
For the joint entropy of A and E we use again the average over the cases of correct
and incorrect measurement basis:
H(A,E) =
1
2
Hc(A,E) +
1
2
Hw(A,E)
= −1
2
1∑
e=0
1∑
a=0
p(e|a, Bc)p(a) log[p(e|a, Bc)p(a)]
−1
2
1∑
e=0
1∑
a=0
p(e|a, Bw)p(a) log[p(e|a, Bw)p(a)]
= −1
2
1∑
e=0
1∑
a=0
p(a)
{
[p(e|a, Bc) + p(e|a, Bw)] log p(a)
+p(e|a, Bc) log p(e|a, Bc) + p(e|a, Bw) log p(e|a, Bw)
}
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= −
1∑
e=0
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)
{
[p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw)] log(2p(a˜))
+p(e|a˜, Bc) log p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw) log p(e|a˜, Bw)
}
(3.19)
= −
1∑
e=0
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)[p(e|a˜, Bc) + p(e|a˜, Bw)] +H(A˜, E)
(2.4)
= −
1∑
e=0
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) · 2p(e|a˜) +H(A˜, E)
(2.3)
= −2
1∑
a˜=0
1∑
e=0
p(e)p(a˜|e) +H(A˜, E)
(2.4)
= −2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) +H(A˜, E) . (3.20)
Equations (3.16), (3.18), and (3.20) yield
I(A,E) = H(E) +H(A)−H(A,E)
= H(E)− 2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜) +H(A˜) + 2
1∑
a˜=0
p(a˜)−H(A˜, E)
= H(E) +H(A˜)−H(A˜, E)
= I(A˜, E) , (3.21)
which completes our proof. Note that in obtaining Eq. (3.21) we used only three
assumptions:
i) p(A˜ = 0) = p(A˜ = +) and p(A˜ = 1) = p(A˜ = −).
ii) p(a) = 2p(a˜) for a, a˜ ∈ {0, 1}.
iii) For a˜ = 0, 1, the z basis is correct and the x basis incorrect, and vice versa for
a˜ = +,−.
Next, we analyze how much errors Eve’s strategy induces to Bob’s sifted key, i.e.,
we calculate the QBER that Alice and Bob observe, given that Eve uses the IR
strategy. The error rate is defined as the probability that an individual bit value in
Bob’s sifted key differs from the corresponding value in Alice’s sifted key. Formally,
QBER = p(b 6= a) =
∑
a
p(B = a¯|A = a)p(a) , (3.22)
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where a and b are the outcomes of Alice and Bob’s random variables A and B,
respectively. The bar over the symbol a¯ represents an increment of 1 modulo 2, i.e.,
0¯ = 1 and 1¯ = 0. The reader is reminded that Eve is in total control of the states
that Bob receives, but has only partial control over Bob’s measurement results, i.e.,
outcomes of B.
Because we are considering bits in the sifted key only, the correctness of Bob’s
result depends on Eve’s basis choice:
QBER =
∑
a
p(B = a¯|A = a)p(a)
(2.5)
=
∑
a
[p(B = a¯, Bc|A = a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+p(B = a¯, Bw|A = a)]p(a)
(2.6)
=
∑
a
p(B = a¯|Bw, A = a)p(Bw|A = a)p(a)
=
1
2
∑
a
p(B = a¯|Bw, A = a)p(Bw)
=
1
4
1∑
a=0
p(B = a¯|Bw, A = a)
=
1
4
(1
2
+
1
2
)
=
1
4
, (3.23)
where we have used the fact that when Eve’s basis choice is wrong, i.e., incompatible
with Alice’s choice, it is also incompatible with Bob’s choice, in which case Bob gets
an incorrect result with probability 1
2
.
In summary, we have shown that the IR attack strategy gives Eve 0.5 bits of
information per interception and induces an average QBER of 25% in the sifted
key. In practice, a 25% QBER would probably be considered too high by Alice
and Bob, and they would thus abort the protocol. However, Eve does not have to
intercept every transmission, instead, she can choose to interfere with only a fraction
0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 of the transmissions. Then Eve’s information as well as the QBER is
linearly parametrized by ξ:
IA,E(ξ) = ξ/2 , (3.24)
QBER(ξ) = ξ/4 , (3.25)
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from which the maximal information Eve can gain for a given QBER q is
I IRmax(q) =
{
2q if 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/4
0.5 if 1/4 < q ≤ 1/2 . (3.26)
Incoherent attack
In an incoherent or individual attack, Eve entangles each transmitted qubit indi-
vidually to a probe. Eve’s probes are quantum systems capable of retaining their
state until the basis reconciliation phase. Alternatively, the state of each probe can
be kept in separate quantum memory3. The probes are assumed to be identical,
and there is one probe for each eavesdropped transmission. Four-dimensional, i.e.,
two-qubit, probes are sufficient for Eve’s purposes in BB84 [71]. After basis recon-
ciliation, Eve measures the probe states one-by-one in an attempt to gain as much
information as possible on the sifted key. The qubit-probe interaction U can be
assumed unitary4 and independent of the state of the qubit. The interaction can
be viewed as an act of transferring information from the transmitted qubit to one
or more probe qubits. For Eve, the optimal choices of U are parametrized by a
real variable η. Therefore, variable η actually parametrizes a whole—uncountably
infinite—family of attacks referred to as incoherent attacks.
The maximal mutual information that Eve can gain with an incoherent attack is
I incoh.max (q) =
(
1
2
+
√
q(1− q)
)
log
(
1 + 2
√
q(1− q))
+
(
1
2
−
√
q(1− q)
)
log
(
1− 2
√
q(1− q)) , (3.27)
where is q is a given QBER. It is also known that an interaction U and a probe
measurement scheme achieving this bound exist [72].
An incoherent attack achieving the bound in Eq. (3.27) is equivalent to optimal
cloning of the transmitted qubit. The optimal cloner is the 1 → 2 phase-covariant
qubit cloner defined by transformation (2.40), which is justified as follows. We
3Long-term quantum memory is a delicate issue in its own right. Photonic physical-qubit
memories are discussed, for example, in Refs. [69, 70].
4A non-unitary interaction would be equivalent to a unitary one, only with a higher-dimensional
probe.
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only consider transmissions that contribute to the sifted key. We assume that Eve
attempts to clone state |+〉, since the calculation is similar for all other BB84 states.
Setting ϕ = 0, Eq. (2.41) yields the result of the cloning process as
|C〉 = U|+〉|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ cos(η)|1〉|0〉+ sin(η)|0〉|1〉) . (3.28)
Eve then sends Bob the qubit in the first slot and keeps the qubit in the second slot
for herself. When Bob measures his qubit, he gets the correct result, i.e., zero in the
x basis, with probability
p(B = 0) = 〈C|(P x0 ⊗ I)|C〉 = 12(1 + cos η) . (3.29)
Hence, the QBER is
q(η) =
1
2
(
1− cos η) . (3.30)
The best strategy for Eve is to simply measure her probe qubit the same way she
measures transmitted qubits in the IR attack. However, because Eve can keep her
probes intact until she learns which basis Alice has used in the transmission, she
knows in which basis to perform the measurement. Eve gets the correct result in
the x basis with probability
PE=0(η) =
1
2
(
1 + sin η
)
. (3.31)
Eve’s mutual information on the key decreases with increasing uncertainty in her
measurement result. That is,
IA,E(η) = 1−Hbin[PE=0(η)] . (3.32)
Eliminating η in Eqs. (3.30) and (3.32) yields the bound in Eq. (3.27). Note the
equivalence of Eqs. (3.29), (3.31) and the fidelities given in Eq. (2.42). For a more
detailed description of the cloning process, see Ref. [27].
Interacting with only a fraction ξ of the transmissions does not provide Eve any
advantage. This is because the mutual-information bound in Eq. (3.27) is a concave
function of q, and hence, for a fixed QBER, adjusting the parameter η and probing
every transmission is always at least as beneficial as not probing every transmission.
Figure 3.2 shows the maximal mutual information as a function of a given QBER
for the incoherent and intercept-resend attacks.
3.1 BB84 protocol 41
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
QBER
I(
A
,E
)
Figure 3.2: Eve’s maximal information on Alice’s sifted key for a given QBER for
intercept-resend (solid line) and incoherent (dashed line) attack strategies against
the BB84 protocol.
Coherent attack
In a coherent attack, Eve is in possession of an unlimited-dimensional probe in an
arbitrary initial state. Eve is allowed to apply any unitary transformation to the
entire transmitted qubit sequence and the probe. The probe state is retained until
all public discussions between Alice and Bob are finished, and Eve is then allowed
to perform arbitrary measurements on the probe system as a whole. Collective
attacks are a subclass of coherent attacks, in which Eve is allowed to entangle the
qubits and probes individually but still use any conceivable measurement scheme
after Alice and Bob’s public discussions. [17]
For coherent attacks, the various security proofs state that the probability, that
Alice and Bob unknowingly agree on a key that Eve has more than an exponentially
small amount of information, is exponentially small in some security parameter
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under Alice and Bob’s control. No explicit maximal mutual information for a given
QBER has been presented in the literature. [68, 73–78]
3.1.6 Privacy amplification
Because an error-free quantum channel does not exist, Alice and Bob have to work
with some finite QBER. Consequently, they can never be absolutely certain that Eve
has not eavesdropped parts of the generated key. Given a long enough key sequence,
however, Alice and Bob can shorten the key and reduce Eve’s information on it to
an arbitrarily low value by public classical communication. This procedure is called
privacy amplification.
The essential step in privacy amplification algorithms is typically the following:
Alice randomly chooses a pair of slots {i, j} in the error-corrected sifted key and
informs Bob of her choice. Both participants then calculate cij = XOR(ai, aj). Alice
and Bob obtain the same value for cij , since their bit strings are identical. They
then replace the bits in slots i and j with the value cij . Any uncertainty Eve has
about the bit values in the slots is always increased by this process. For example, if
Eve only knows the value of the bit in slot i, after privacy amplification she knows
nothing of the value of slot i. This step is iterated for as long as is necessary to bring
Eve’s maximal information on the key to a low enough value. More sophisticated
protocols work on larger bit blocks. [18]
3.2 Other protocols
3.2.1 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen protocol
In 1991, A. Ekert published the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) QKD protocol,
sometimes referred to as E91 [13]. This protocol is named after the famous EPR
thought experiment constructed to prove that quantum mechanics is not a complete
description of reality [24,79]. In the EPR protocol, Alice and Bob do not send quan-
tum states to each other, but instead rely on a third party, Charlie, to transmit two
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qubits in an entangled state, one qubit to Alice and the other to Bob. Specifically,
the state that Charlie emits is
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉) , (3.33)
also known as one of the Bell states. A pair of qubits in this state are said to form an
EPR pair. Upon reception of the qubits, Alice and Bob randomly choose between
two measurement bases, just as in BB84. Later the bases are announced in public,
and the sifted key is obtained by discarding the results for which the bases did not
match.
Alice and Bob can perform a test to see whether Charlie truly emits the state in
Eq. (3.33). This test is based on Bell’s inequality which demonstrates that a local
theory cannot give the correlations that quantum mechanics predicts [80]. To be
completely assured that Eve has not tampered with the emitted state, Alice and
Bob must observe a maximal violation of Bell’s inequality. In practice, because
of noise or eavesdropping, only a sub-maximal violation is observed, requiring the
use of error correction and privacy amplification for obtaining a secret key. When
Charlie emits state |Φ+〉, this protocol is equivalent to BB84 [18].
3.2.2 Two-state protocol
In 1992, C. H. Bennett proposed a simple variant of the original BB84 protocol [8].
It is known as B92 or the two-state protocol. The latter name comes from the
essential modification to BB84. The four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} used in BB84
are more than is necessary for Eve not being able to eavesdrop the transmissions
without being noticed. In fact, using only two non-orthogonal states suffices, e.g.,
|0〉 and |+〉. In the B92 protocol, Alice randomly chooses which one of the two states
she transmits, and Bob randomly chooses a measurement basis for each reception.
The rest of the protocol is identical to BB84. The requirement of transmitting only
two different states renders the experimental implementation of the protocol less
demanding. Although Eve still inevitably perturbs the transmission if she interferes
with it, she can unambiguously distinguish between the two states at the cost of
some transmissions being lost completely. [18]
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3.2.3 Six-state protocol
Another fairly simple variant of BB84 is the six-state protocol proposed by D. Bruß
in 1998 [9]. The six-state protocol uses three conjugate bases for the quantum
channel transmissions: not only the eigenbases of Pauli matrices σx and σz but also
the eigenbase of σy. Alice randomly transmits and Bob randomly measures in one
of these bases. The intercept-resend strategy induces a 33% QBER in this protocol.
If Eve employs an incoherent attack against this protocol, then given a QBER q,
her maximal information on the key is
I incoh.max (q) = 1− (1− q)Hbin[g(q)] , where (3.34)
g(q) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
1− q
√
q(2− 3q)
)
. (3.35)
This is less than, although close to, the maximum in Eq. (3.27) for 0 < q < 0.5.
That is, to achieve the same information on the key, Eve must induce a slightly
higher QBER than in the original BB84. However, because Alice and Bob use
three different bases, Bob chooses the correct basis on average only 1
3
of the time.
Therefore, to generate a sifted key of given length, more quantum transmissions are
needed than in the BB84 protocol.
3.2.4 Adjusted basis probabilities protocol
In the original BB84 protocol, the two transmission and measurement bases z and x
are chosen with equal probabilities. In 1998, M. Ardehali et al. proposed a variant
in which the use of one of the bases has a significantly higher probability [10]. The
adjusted probability is announced in public. The advantage of this modification is
that a considerably smaller amount of measurement results need to be discarded in
the basis reconciliation phase. However, Eve’s information on the key is higher, since
she can always employ the basis that is used more frequently. To counteract this,
the authors suggest a sophisticated error analysis scheme. It is not clear whether
this modification ultimately improves on the efficiency of BB84.
Chapter 4
Analysis and Results
This chapter describes in detail our proposed amendment to the BB84 protocol. The
purpose of the modification is to yield Alice and Bob advantage against an eaves-
dropper in terms of mutual information. As a demonstration of the idea behind the
modification, we present an analysis of the difficulty of approximating an entangled
state of two qubits with two product-state qubits. As our main result, we give ex-
plicit bounds on the information of an eavesdropper employing an intercept-resend
attack against our protocol as a function of the qubit error rate. We also discuss
a special kind of attack against this protocol, one in which Eve recreates destroyed
entanglement using EPR pairs.
4.1 Proposed modification to the BB84 protocol
We analyze a protocol based on the BB84 protocol. Our protocol differs from the
original one in the following:
1. Prior to the key distribution, Alice and Bob publicly agree on an N -qubit
unitary transformation U : HN → HN .
2. Alice’s actions differ from BB84 such that she
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(a) postpones her transmissions1 until she has generated N qubits to trans-
mit,
(b) then applies U to the qubits, and
(c) transmits them one at a time, always waiting for Bob to acknowledge the
reception of the previous qubit before sending the next one.
3. Bob’s actions differ from BB84 such that he
(a) postpones his measurements until N qubits have arrived,
(b) immediately acknowledges each received qubit to Alice, and
(c) having received a sequence of N qubits, applies U−1 = U † to the qubits
and measures them exactly as in BB84.
The transformation U can be viewed as an extension or a plug-in to the BB84
protocol. Without Eve’s interference, the use of U and U−1 is fully transparent
from Alice’s and Bob’s point of view. Note that Eve is fully aware of U , since it is
announced in public. Because Bob acknowledges every arrived qubit, Eve has only
one-by-one access to the particles of the N -qubit state. The transformation is
U(|a1〉 ⊗ |a2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |aN 〉) = |ψa1,a2,...,aN 〉 , (4.1)
where |ai〉 are the states of the original BB84 protocol, i.e., |ai〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}.
In our modified protocol, Alice sends the qubits of the state |ψa1,a2,...,aN 〉 to Bob one
at a time.
If U is of the form
U = U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ UN , (4.2)
where Uj are single-qubit gates, i.e, Uj : C
2 → C2 for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, then
U(|a1〉 ⊗ |a2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |aN〉) = (U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ UN )(|a1〉 ⊗ |a2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |aN〉)
= U1|a1〉 ⊗ U2|a2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ UN |aN〉
= |ψa1〉 ⊗ |ψa2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψaN 〉 . (4.3)
1Postponing the processing of existing qubits in items 2(a), 2(c), and 3(a) requires that Alice
and Bob employ short-term quantum memory.
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In other words, if U is decomposable to single-qubit gates, the transmitted N -qubit
state is a product state. Given the product state, Eve can perfectly undo U , attack
the individual unentangled qubits, and reconstruct the transmitted state by using
the single-qubit gates U †j and Uj. Therefore, Alice and Bob should choose U such
that it produces an entangled N -qubit state. This implies
U 6= U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ UN . (4.4)
That is, by using a non-local U , Alice and Bob utilize entanglement to prohibit Eve
from fully accessing the transmitted qubits. In the following sections we restrict our
analysis to the case N = 2.
4.2 Product-state approximation of an entangled
qubit pair
To demonstrate the underlying idea in using an entangling N -qubit gate in BB84,
we perform an analysis on how closely an entangled two-qubit state can be ap-
proximated with two product-state qubits. This analysis shows that even if perfect
cloning of quantum states was possible, the protocol poses an inherent limitation
for Eve.
Assume that Eve constructs the state
N⊗
i=1
|ψi〉 , |ψi〉 ∈ C2 = H1 , |||ψi〉|| = 1 , (4.5)
in an attempt to approximate a normalized state |ψ〉 ∈ C2N = HN being transmitted
one qubit at a time from Alice to Bob. Eve tries to minimize the error in this
approximation whereas Alice and Bob want to maximize Eve’s minimal error by
choosing |ψ〉 appropriately. This maximal-minimal error is
Emm := max|ψ〉
min
{|ψi〉}
∣∣∣∣∣∣|ψ〉 − N⊗
i=1
|ψi〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (4.6)
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4.2.1 Theory
We assume that Alice and Bob have chosen N = 2. We write the state Alice uses as
|ψ〉 = ( rα1eiα1 rα2eiα2 rα3eiα3 rα4eiα4 )T , (4.7)
and the states Eve uses as
|ψ1〉 =
(
rφ1e
iφ1 rφ2e
iφ2
)T
, (4.8)
|ψ2〉 =
(
rω1e
iω1 rω2e
iω2
)T
. (4.9)
Normalization of the state vectors implies
r2α1 + r
2
α2
+ r2α3 + r
2
α4
= 1 , (4.10)
r2φ1 + r
2
φ2
= 1 , (4.11)
r2ω1 + r
2
ω2
= 1 . (4.12)
The moduli rαj are conveniently parametrized by three angles θ¯ = (θ1, θ2, θ3) as the
surface of a four-dimensional sphere:
rα1 = cos θ1
rα2 = sin θ1 cos θ2
rα3 = sin θ1 sin θ2 cos θ3
rα4 = sin θ1 sin θ2 sin θ3 .
(4.13)
The moduli of Eve’s qubits represent two circles for which two angles Φ and Ω suffice
as
rφ1 = cosΦ and rφ2 = sinΦ , (4.14)
rω1 = cosΩ and rω2 = sinΩ . (4.15)
After several simplifying steps, one obtains
Emm =
{
2[1−min
θ¯,α¯
max
Φ,Ω,φ¯,ω¯
G(θ¯, α¯,Φ,Ω, φ¯, ω¯)]
}1/2
, (4.16)
where the complex argument parameters are gathered into vectors
α¯ = (α1, α2, α3, α4) ; φ¯ = (φ1, φ2) ; ω¯ = (ω1, ω2) . (4.17)
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The function G, which Eve tries to maximize and whose maximum Alice and Bob
attempt to minimize, is
G(θ¯, α¯,Φ,Ω, φ¯, ω¯) := cosΦ [cosΩ cos(α1 − φ1 − ω1) cos θ1
+ sinΩ cos(α2 − φ1 − ω2) sin θ1 cos θ2]
+ sinΦ [cosΩ cos(α3 − φ2 − ω1) sin θ1 sin θ2 cos θ3
+ sinΩ cos(α4 − φ2 − ω2) sin θ1 sin θ2 sin θ3] . (4.18)
Global bounds for the error follow from the extreme values of G
− 1 ≤ G ≤ 1 ⇒ 0 ≤ Emm ≤ 2 . (4.19)
Because Alice and Bob wish to maximize the norm in Eq. (4.6), it is of no use to
consider parameters in the set
{
θ¯, α¯
}
that have no effect on the minimal value Eve is
trying to achieve. We show that it is in fact sufficient to consider the maximization
with three of the phases αj fixed—varying them cannot increase the minimum.
Firstly, the global phase of the pair |ψ〉 offers Alice and Bob no advantage, as it is
directly reproduced by Eve. Secondly, Eve can apply any single-qubit gates to |ψ1〉
and |ψ2〉. For instance, Eve can freely choose β1, β2, β3 ∈ R and apply the gate
eiβ0
(
eiβ1σz ⊗ eiβ2σz) =

ei(β0+β1+β2) 0 0 0
0 ei(β0+β1−β2) 0 0
0 0 ei(β0−β1+β2) 0
0 0 0 ei(β0−β1−β2)

(4.20)
to her qubit pair. The global phase shift is implemented by β0. By choosing the βj
as 
β0 + β1 + β2 = α1
β0 + β1 − β2 = α2
β0 − β1 + β2 = α3
⇔

β0 =
1
2
(α2 + α3)
β1 =
1
2
(α1 − α3)
β2 =
1
2
(α1 − α2)
, (4.21)
Eve can reproduce the phases α1, α2, α3 in |ψ〉. Therefore, Alice and Bob may as
well fix their value. Similar reasoning can be applied to the amplitudes r∆, which
is, however, not carried out here.
4.2.2 Solution
Having fixed α1 = α2 = α3 = 0, we solve for Emm, optimizing over θ¯, α4 and
Φ,Ω, φ¯, ω¯. We use the built-in numerical optimization function of Mathematica
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version 5.1.0.0 by Wolfram Research, Inc. As with any numerical maximization or
minimization method, there are no guarantees that the found optimum is the global
optimum. As discussed below, however, it is likely that a global optimum is found.
For the maximization of G over Eve’s parameters, we employ the RandomSearch
optimization method which generates, in this case, 100 random parameter start-
ing points for the standard FindMinimum function. RandomSearch is a suitable
method for maximizing G, since G is a continuous and smooth function in all its
arguments [81]. The minimization of this maximum is performed with the Simu-
latedAnnealing method. Simulated annealing is a well-known optimization method
that has similarities to the process of a physical system cooling down. First, the
method randomly generates a set of starting points for the parameters. It also
generates a random direction in the parameter space for each point. If moving to
the selected direction satisfies the optimization goal better, the move is accepted,
whereas if the move satisfies the goal worse, it is accepted with probability pm. The
probability pm decreases with each iteration, and also depends on how well the move
satisfies the optimization goal. This procedure is repeated until the method stays
at the same point for sufficiently many iterations, or until a predefined number
of iterations is exceeded. Simulated annealing is a universally valid optimization
method.
4.2.3 Results
We find that Emm = 0.673. This is achieved by choosing θ¯ = (1.228, 0.848,−0.499)
and α4 = 0.474 with α¯ = (0, 0, 0, α4). To further confirm the result, the maxi-
mization of G over Eve’s parameters was also performed with the differential evolu-
tion, Nelder-Mead, and simulated annealing methods, in addition to RandomSearch.
The details of the methods are not discussed here, for more information, see, e.g.,
Ref. [81]. Many different initial values were also tested. All these methods and all
tested initial values resulted in the same maximum for G. Therefore, we are confi-
dent that we indeed have obtained the global maximum of G for the values of θ¯ and
α¯ given above. The optimal choice of Eve’s parameters is not unique. Due to finite
computing resources, no such intensive testing was applied to the more demanding
minimization of the maximum of G over θ¯ and α¯. Hence, we only state that the
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obtained values for θ¯ and α¯ are the optimal choice for Alice and Bob with high
probability. That is, we settle for the confidence the simulated annealing method
provides.
The obtained optimal values for θ¯ and α¯ approximately correspond to the state
|ψ〉 = ( 0.34 0.62 0.62 −0.30− 0.15i )T . (4.22)
The best Eve can do to approximate |ψ〉 with her two unentangled qubits is to
choose, for example, Φ = 2.365, Ω = 0.797, φ1 = 1.243, φ2 = 3.034, ω1 = 2.801, and
ω2 = 1.472. This approximately corresponds to the state
|ψ1〉⊗|ψ2〉 =
(
0.31 + 0.39i 0.46− 0.21i 0.44− 0.21i −0.10− 0.49i )T . (4.23)
To recapitulate, if Alice and Bob provide Eve with the state in Eq. (4.22), it is
guaranteed that the error in Eve’s approximation is at least 0.673.
4.3 Analysis of an intercept-resend attack
In this section, we aim at answering the question: “Assuming Eve uses the intercept-
resend attack strategy, which U should Alice and Bob choose?” In the BB84 pro-
tocol, the IR attack strategy is less efficient than an optimal incoherent attack.
However, it is not clear that the same holds for our augmented protocol. Moreover,
if a transformation U provides Alice and Bob advantage against an IR attack, it is
likely that the advantage stands, at least to some extent, against more sophisticated
attacks, as well.
4.3.1 Parametrization of U
An arbitrary two-qubit gate has 16 degrees of freedom. For Alice and Bob’s purposes
however, several of these are useless. Firstly, one degree of freedom arises from the
global phase shift introduced by the gate. It is well known that the global phase of
the qubit pair is irrelevant. We can always choose the global phase such that the
determinant of the gate is +1. Thus we can restrict our search to the special unitary
group SU(4), the members of which have 42 − 1 = 15 degrees of freedom.
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Following the treatment of J. Zhang et al. [82], we partition the group SU(4) into
two: the subset of local gates, L4 := SU(2) ⊗ SU(2), and the subset of non-local
gates, NL4 := SU(4)\SU(2) ⊗ SU(2). It is shown in Ref. [82] that any U ∈ SU(4)
can be decomposed as
U = k2A(c1, c2, c3)k1 (4.24)
= (k2,1 ⊗ k2,2) exp
[
i
2
(c1 σx ⊗ σx + c2 σy ⊗ σy + c3 σz ⊗ σz)
]
(k1,1 ⊗ k1,2) ,
where ki ∈ L4 and thus ki,j ∈ SU(2) and the parameters cl ∈ [0, pi] , l = 1, 2, 3.
Quantum circuits are a graphical way of representing quantum information pro-
cessing, such as the application of a gate k2A(c1, c2, c3)k1 on two qubits. In a quan-
tum circuit diagram, a single horizontal line represents a qubit. A double horizontal
line represents a cbit. Time progresses from left to right, and an operation O tar-
geted to one or more qubits is shown as a box placed on top of the qubits involved
in the operation O.
U A
k1,1 k2,1
k1,2 k2,2
(15) (3)
(3) (3)
(3)(3)
=
Figure 4.1: Any U ∈ SU(4), shown left, is equal to a decomposition shown on the
right. The number of degrees of freedom is shown in parentheses for each gate.
A
k1,1
k1,2
(3)
(3)
(3)
Figure 4.2: A simplified gate model that is at least as useful for Alice and Bob as
any other two-qubit transformation. The number of degrees of freedom is displayed
in parentheses for each gate.
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Figure 4.1 shows on the right the quantum circuit of the decomposed gate U . The
qubits |a1〉, |a2〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} generated by Alice enter the circuit from the
left and depart at the right end after the application of U . Since we are interested
in the security of this protocol, we assume that after the gate U both qubits travel
to Eve. Note that we do not assume that Eve necessarily does anything to either
qubit. If Alice employs k2 = k2,1 ⊗ k2,2, Eve can always undo and redo it perfectly
with the single-qubit gates k†2,1, k
†
2,2 and k2,1, k2,2. Hence, k2 is useless to Alice and
Bob, and we may further restrict our search for a good gate U to gates of the form
A(c1, c2, c3)k1, shown in Fig. 4.2. Thus we are left with 9 degrees of freedom for U .
4.3.2 Explicit matrices
To be able to simulate the amended protocol, we have to write down the matrix for
the transformation U explicitly. Any single-qubit gate k ∈ SU(2) can be written as
k(a1, a2, a3) =
(
eia1 cos a2 e
ia3 sin a2
−e−ia3 sin a2 e−ia1 cos a2
)
. (4.25)
The explicit matrix for the non-local gate A(c1, c2, c3) = exp[i(c1 σx⊗σx+c2 σy⊗σy+
c3 σz ⊗ σz)/2] is obtained by first finding the eigensystem of the hermitian operator
B := c1 σx ⊗ σx + c2 σy ⊗ σy + c3 σz ⊗ σz and then applying
f(B) =
∑
j
f(λj)|λj〉〈λj| , (4.26)
where λj are the eigenvalues and |λj〉 the corresponding eigenvectors of the hermitian
operator B. Equation (4.26) is a direct consequence of the spectral decomposition
theorem and holds for any analytic function f . In this case, f(·) = ei(·)/2. The result
is
A(c1, c2, c3) =
eic3/2 cos
(
c1−c2
2
)
0 0 ieic3/2 sin
(
c1−c2
2
)
0 e−ic3/2 cos
(
c1+c2
2
)
ie−ic3/2 sin
(
c1+c2
2
)
0
0 ie−ic3/2 sin
(
c1+c2
2
)
e−ic3/2 cos
(
c1+c2
2
)
0
ieic3/2 sin
(
c1−c2
2
)
0 0 eic3/2 cos
(
c1−c2
2
)
 .
(4.27)
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4.3.3 Simulation
We simulate the progress of our protocol with different transformations U and ob-
serve the QBER induced by Eve and Eve’s mutual information on Alice’s sifted
key. Eve is assumed to employ the intercept-resend attack. She is allowed to choose
between a projective measurement in either the z or x basis and not to perform any
measurement individually for each of the two transmitted qubits. In the original
BB84 protocol, it is clear that the z and x bases are the best measurement bases
for Eve. In our augmented protocol, this is not necessarily true. For simplicity,
however, we restrict Eve’s measurements to these bases.
Preliminary remarks
Let A denote the random variable that fully determines which pair of BB84 states
|a1〉|a2〉 Alice constructs prior to the application of the non-local gate. That is,
A takes its values with uniform probability from the set {00, 01, 10, 11, 0+, 0−, 1+,
1−,+0,+1,−0,−1,++,+−,−+,−−}. The physical state is obtained for each out-
come a1a2 by surrounding the label with the bracket construct |a1a2〉. Let us re-label
the outcomes with integers in the range [0, 15], in the order they are presented above,
with the symbol a. For example, a1 = + and a2 = 1 is expressed as a = 9.
Let E denote the random variable that gives the joint result of Eve’s measure-
ments, and let e denote the outcome of E. The value of e ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is obtained
by interpreting the separate results e1, e2 ∈ {0, 1} as a binary number e1e2 with e2
as the least significant bit.
We may calculate Eve’s mutual information on Alice’s sifted key as her mutual
information I(A,E) on the random variable A. These two mutual informations are
equal, which can be shown in exactly the same way as was done in Sec. 3.1.5 for
one cbit and qubit in the original BB84 protocol. Due to the close similarities, the
proof is not reproduced for the case of two cbits and qubits.
Because of finite computing resources, we use only the non-local gate A(c1, c2, c3)
in our simulation. It is likely that using in addition the local gate k1 benefits Alice
and Bob, but it is also plausible that part of this gate commutes with the gate A in
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the sense that Eve would be able to undo k1 partially with single-qubit gates. This
possibility is not investigated further in this Thesis.
Figure 4.3 shows the quantum transmission phase of the protocol and the attack
we simulate as a quantum circuit for one qubit pair. In practice, Eve’s measurement
scheme may be such that the measured qubits are demolished. In this case, she
creates new physical qubits in the logical state corresponding to her measurement
result. This is equivalent to performing a non-demolishing projective measurement.
Figure 4.3: The full quantum circuit of the proposed protocol and the attack for a
qubit pair. The interleaving classical communication between Alice and Bob is not
shown. The circuit is run a large number of times in each use of the protocol. The
actions of each participant are enclosed in dotted boxes. A semicircle represents
a projective measurement. Eve performs measurements but not necessarily on the
first qubit. Symbols e1 and e2 denote Eve’s measurement results, and b1 and b2
Bob’s results which are assumed to contribute to the sifted key.
The protocol is sampled over a large number of different gates A(c1, c2, c3). We
run a numerical Mathematica code that records I(A,E) and the QBER observed
by Bob for Eve’s allowed measurement bases and a given gate A. The algorithm is
presented below. The code is run with different values of the parameters c1, c2, c3
for the gate A. Each ci takes values in the interval [0, pi] with
pi
32
steps. That is, we
sample the three-dimensional parameter space uniformly with 333 ≈ 36000 points.
This is not an exhaustive survey of the possibilities of the use of a non-local gate, but
as long as Eve obeys the presented assumptions, the obtained maximum of I(A,E)
holds for the given parameters c1, c2, c3.
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The following paragraphs describe phase-by-phase the algorithm used in the sim-
ulation of our protocol. The algorithm has not been optimized for performance,
but instead kept in a form close to the underlying mathematics and physics. In
the actual code, all calculation is done numerically. Every transmission state of
the original BB84 protocol is assumed to occur with equal probability, and we only
consider transmissions that contribute to the sifted key.
Phase 1: Non-local transformation
First, the gate A(c1, c2, c3) is applied to all 16 possible qubit-pair states used in the
original BB84 protocol.
|ψa1a2〉 = A(c1, c2, c3)|a1〉|a2〉 , a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1,+,−} . (4.28)
The qubit in the left slot, i.e., originally in state |a1〉, is sent first.
Phase 2: Eve’s first measurement
Eve may choose not to measure either of the two qubits. Since we apply a symmetric
gate to the qubit pair, measuring only the first qubit is equivalent to measuring only
the second qubit. Therefore, it suffices to simulate the protocol with Eve skipping
the measurement only on the first qubit. If Eve does not measure either qubit, there
is nothing to simulate.
If Eve has chosen to measure the first qubit, the measurement is calculated in the
z and x bases. Based on Eq. (2.22), the probability of measurement outcome e1 is
p (E1 = e1|PE1 = ε1, A = a) = 〈ψa1a2 |
(
P ε1e1 ⊗ I
) |ψa1a2〉 , (4.29)
where En is the random variable corresponding to the result of Eve’s measurement
of qubit n ∈ {1, 2} and ε1 is Eve’s basis choice. The post-measurement state is
|ψa1a2(e1, ε1)〉 :=
(
P ε1e1 ⊗ I
) |ψa1a2〉/√p(e1|ε1, a) , (4.30)
in accordance with Eq. (2.23). However, if p(e1|ε1, a) = 0, we define
|ψa1a2(e1, ε1)〉 :=
(
0 0 0 0
)T
. (4.31)
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If Eve does not measure the first qubit, we define |ψa1a2(e1, ε1)〉 := |ψa1a2〉 and mark
the probabilities of all outcomes as 1, which is mathematically inconsistent, but is
later taken into account.
Phase 3: Eve’s second measurement
Eve chooses a measurement basis for the second qubit and applies a projective
measurement in the z or x basis. The probability of measurement outcome e2 is
p (E2 = e2|E1 = e1, PE1 = ε1, PE2 = ε2, A = a)
= 〈ψa1a2(e1, ε1)|
(
I ⊗ P ε2e2
) |ψa1a2(e1, ε1)〉 , (4.32)
where ε2 is Eve’s basis choice for the second measurement. If the result e1 is im-
possible, the probability in Eq. (4.32) is correctly zero, since in this case the state
vector is the zero vector. After both of Eve’s measurements, Bob is in possession of
the qubit pair which is in state
|ψa1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2)〉 :=
(
I ⊗ P ε2e2
) |ψa1a2(e1, ε1)〉/√p (e2|e1, ε1, ε2, a) . (4.33)
Again, if p (e2|e1, ε1, ε2, a) = 0, we define the state to be the zero vector.
Mutual information
We allow Eve to choose the measurement basis independently for each qubit and
calculate I(A,E) for the different basis choices. Since the QBER also depends
on the measurement basis, we must keep track of the results of all the choices to
obtain a complete picture of Eve’s capabilities. Because we consider the different
basis choices separately, we may omit the explicit conditioning on the basis in all
probabilities.
To be able to compare our results with other QKD protocols, we calculate Eve’s
information per bit. The mutual information of A and E given by Eq. (2.11) yields
Eve’s information on a two-bit entity. Thus the mutual information per bit is half
of this, i.e.,
I(A,E) =
1
2
[H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E)] . (4.34)
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The entropy H(A) is always
H(A) = −
15∑
j=0
p(a) log p(a) = −
15∑
j=0
1
16
log
(
1
16
)
= 4 . (4.35)
According to Eq. (2.6),
p(e|a)
= p(E = e1e2|A = a)
= p(e2|e1, ε1, ε2, a)p(e1|ε1, ε2, a) , (4.36)
the two factors of which have been calculated in Eqs. (4.29) and (4.32). The entropy
of Eve’s variable is
Hm(E) = −
m∑
e=0
p(e) log p(e)
(2.4)
= −
m∑
e=0
[
15∑
a=0
p(e|a)p(a)
]
log
[
15∑
a=0
p(e|a)p(a)
]
= − 1
16
m∑
e=0
[
15∑
a=0
p(e|a)
]{
log
[
15∑
a=0
p(e|a)
]
− 4
}
, (4.37)
where m = 1, if Eve measures only the second qubit, and m = 3, if Eve measures
both qubits. This is justified by noting that if the first measurement is not per-
formed, all probabilities of e1 are designated value 1 and E2 does not depend on E1,
and thus p(e|a) = p(e2|a) given by Eq. (4.32).
The joint entropy of A and E is
Hm(A,E)
(2.10)
= −
m∑
e=0
15∑
a=0
p(e, a) log p(e, a)
(2.2)
= −
m∑
e=0
15∑
a=0
p(e|a)p(a) log [p(e|a)p(a)]
= − 1
16
m∑
e=0
15∑
a=0
p(e|a) [log p(e|a)− 4]
=
1
4
m∑
e=0
15∑
a=0
p(e|a)− 1
16
m∑
e=0
15∑
a=0
p(e|a) log p(e|a) . (4.38)
If p(e|a) = 0 for some e and a, we assign value zero to the term p(e|a) log p(e|a).
4.3 Analysis of an intercept-resend attack 59
Phase 4: Inverse non-local transformation
Once Bob has received both qubits, he applies A†(c1, c2, c3) to the pair, and obtains
the state
|ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2)〉 := A†(c1, c2, c3)|ψa1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2)〉 . (4.39)
If Eve had not interfered with either qubit, it would be safe to write this as a product
state.
Phase 5: Bob’s first measurement
Bob projectively measures both qubits in correct bases. For the first qubit, the
probability of result b1 ∈ {0, 1} given A = a1a2 and E = e1e2 is
p(b1|a1a2, e1e2) = 〈ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2)|
(
P
δ1,a
b1
⊗ I
)
|ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2)〉 , (4.40)
where
δ1,a =
{
z if a ∈ [0, 7]
x if a ∈ [8, 15] . (4.41)
If the result e1e2 is impossible, the probability is zero because the state vector is the
zero vector. The probability of b1 given only A = a1a2 is
p(b1|a) (2.5)=
m∑
e=0
p(b1, e|a) (2.6)=
m∑
e=0
p(b1|a, e)p(e|a) . (4.42)
Bob’s first measurement projects the qubit pair into state
|ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2, b1)〉 = P
δ1,a
b1
|ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2)〉
/√
p(b1|a1a2, e1e2) , (4.43)
unless p(b1|a1a2, e1e2) = 0, in which case the state is the zero vector.
QBER of the first qubit
If the transmission has no errors, the first measurement yields value 0 for a ∈ A10 =
{0, 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13}, and value 1 for a ∈ A11 = {2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15}. Thus the
QBER of the first qubit is, according to Eq. (3.22),
QBER1 =
1
16
[ ∑
a∈A10
p(B1 = 1|a) +
∑
a∈A11
p(B1 = 0|a)
]
, (4.44)
where Bi is the random variable that yields the result of Bob’s ith measurement.
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Phase 6: Bob’s second measurement
Bob measures the second qubit. The probability of getting result b2 ∈ {0, 1} given
A = a1a2 is
p(b2|a) (2.5)=
1∑
b1=0
p(b2, b1|a)
(2.6)
=
1∑
b1=0
p(b2|b1, a)p(b1|a)
(2.5)
=
1∑
b1=0
m∑
e=0
p(b2, e|b1, a)p(b1|a)
(2.6)
=
1∑
b1=0
m∑
e=0
p(b2|b1, e, a)p(e|b1, a)p(b1|a)
(2.7)
=
1∑
b1=0
m∑
e=0
p(b2|b1, e, a)p(b1|e, a) p(e|a)
p(b1|a)p(b1|a)
=
1∑
b1=0
m∑
e=0
p(b2|b1, e, a)p(b1|e, a)p(e|a) . (4.45)
The first factor in the term is obtained by calculating
p(b2|b1, e, a) = 〈ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2, b1)|
(
I ⊗ P δ2,ab2
)
|ψBoba1a2(e1, ε1, e2, ε2, b1)〉 , (4.46)
where
δ2,a =
{
z if a ∈ [0, 3] or a ∈ [8, 11]
x if a ∈ [4, 7] or a ∈ [12, 15] . (4.47)
Again, if result b1 or result e1e2 is impossible, the probability is zero because the
state is the zero vector.
Total QBER
After an error-free transmission, the second measurement yields value 0 for even
values of a and 1 for odd values of a. Therefore, the QBER of the second qubit is
QBER2 =
1
16
[ ∑
a even
p(B2 = 1|a) +
∑
a odd
p(B2 = 0|a)
]
. (4.48)
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The total QBER is the average over the individual error rates:
QBER =
1
2
(QBER1 +QBER2) . (4.49)
4.3.4 Results
We are interested in finding the maximum of Eve’s mutual information on Alice’s
sifted key, I(A,E), for a given QBER observed by Alice and Bob. In the analyzed
attack, Eve has six different measurement configurations for each gate A(c1, c2, c3).
She can measure both qubits in bases zz, zx, xz, or xx, or she can measure only
the second qubit, in z or x basis. Due to the symmetry of the protocol with respect
to the two transmitted qubits, the case where Eve measures only the first qubit
needs no analysis—it is equivalent to measuring only the second one. Furthermore,
using any of the six configurations, Eve can choose to interfere with only a fraction
0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 of the transmitted qubit pairs.
Figure 4.4 shows I(A,E) as a function of QBER for the sampled parameter values
in the different measurement configurations. The results are identical for bases zx
and xz, and very similar for bases zz and xx, if Eve measures both qubits. If Eve
measures only the second qubit, the results are very similar for both basis choices.
The fraction ξ = 1 in all plots.
Which measurement configuration yields most information on Alice’s key? For
example, consider the situation for the gate A
(
6pi
32
, 25pi
32
, 5pi
32
)
, shown in Fig. 4.5. The
filled circle represents Eve measuring only the second qubit. This configuration
provides least information and induces least errors. For the same QBER ≈ 0.24,
Eve obtains more information with any other configuration by adjusting ξ properly,
illustrated by the dashed and solid lines parametrized by 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. Hence, mea-
suring only one of the qubits does not provide maximal information. In fact, the
same reasoning applies for any gate setting c1, c2, c3, and we therefore ignore this
measurement configuration in the following analysis.
By measuring both qubits in the z basis, denoted by the square in Fig. 4.5, Eve
maximizes her information as well as the QBER for the considered gate. Although
measuring both qubits in the x basis, denoted by the triangle, yields less information,
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Figure 4.4: Eve’s mutual information per bit on Alice’s sifted key and the corre-
sponding QBER for the sampled values of c1, c2, c3, and ξ = 1. The left panel shows
the case where Eve measures both qubits and chooses zx or xz as her measurement
bases. In the right panel, the lower set of points corresponds to Eve measuring only
the second qubit in either basis, and the upper set to Eve measuring both qubits in
the same basis. The upper envelope curve of the set in the left panel is the lower
envelope curve for the upper set in the right panel.
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the relative decrease in the QBER is larger. Thus, for any QBER up to that of the
triangle, the xx bases provide most information. That is, the slope of the ξ line is
larger for the xx bases. Furthermore, as is shown in Fig. 4.4, for ξ = 1, the induced
QBER is always at least 25%. Having observed a QBER this high, Alice and Bob
would most likely abort the protocol. Hence, Eve should always adjust ξ < 1 such
that the QBER is well below 25%, and choose the configuration providing the largest
slope for the line and thus maximal information. For any gate A, this configuration
always involves measuring both qubits in either the z basis or the x basis, and
hence we choose this to be Eve’s configuration. This result is consistent with the
symmetry of the gate A—there is no reason why it would be beneficial to employ
different measurement bases for the qubits. Figure 4.6 shows the mutual information
as a function of QBER for the selected configuration and ξ = 1. For each sampled
gate, the maximal information is at most 0.011 bits more than that given by the
configuration corresponding to the largest slope.
The plot in Fig. 4.6 is generated as follows. For (c1, c2, c3) = (0, 0, 0) the mutual
information is 0.5 and the QBER 25%. This is consistent with the original BB84,
since A(0, 0, 0) is just the two-qubit identity transformation. The smallest infor-
mation and the highest QBER, point (0.5, 0.125), is achieved with, e.g., the gate
A
(
0, pi
2
, 0
)
. The lower envelope curve for the set of points in Fig. 4.6 is obtained by
sweeping c2 ∈
[
0, pi
2
]
while keeping c1 = c3 = 0. Each of the concave arcs above the
envelope are obtained by sweeping over c3 for different values of c2. For instance, if
c1 = 0 and c2 =
13pi
16
, increasing c3 from 0 to
pi
2
produces the dashed arc in Fig. 4.6.
For different values of c1, the sweeps over c2 and c3 yield arcs of different shape in
the same set of points. We thus observe that adjusting c1 is redundant, the same
effect is achieved by an appropriate choice of c2 and c3.
Let us compare our protocol with the original BB84. Figure 4.7 shows Eve’s
maximal information as a function of QBER for BB84 and for three representative
gates in our protocol. The oblique lines are obtained by varying ξ ∈ [0, 1]. The solid
line denotes BB84 and the densely dashed lines our protocol for settings c1 = c3 = 0
and c2 =
pi
8
, pi
4
, pi
2
. Our protocol provides Eve less information and induces more
errors in the sifted key for a given ξ. For instance, by employing gate A(0, pi
8
, 0),
Eve’s information is decreased by 0.0875 bits and the QBER increased by only 0.037,
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Figure 4.5: Eve’s information on Alice’s key and the induced QBER for the gate
A
(
6pi
32
, 25pi
32
, 5pi
32
)
. The filled circle corresponds to Eve measuring only the second qubit.
The open symbols correspond to the cases where Eve measures both qubits: The
circle denotes the zx or xz bases, the square bases zz, and the triangle bases xx.
The mutual information and the QBER are slightly larger for the zz than for the
xx choice. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines show Eve’s information for ξ ∈ [0, 1]
for bases zz, xx, and zx, respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Eve’s information on Alice’s key and the induced QBER for the sampled
gates and ξ = 1, given that Eve chooses the measurement configuration yielding the
largest slope for the ξ-parametrized line. The solid line illustrates the lower envelope
of the set, obtained by sweeping over c2 for c1 = c3 = 0. The dashed line is obtained
by sweeping over c3 for c1 = 0 and c2 =
13pi
16
.
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for ξ = 1. In BB84, the incoherent attack provides approximately 0.13 bits more
information than the IR attack for a 20% QBER, as is shown in Fig. 3.2. In our
protocol, Eve’s information for the same QBER can be reduced from 0.4 to 0.05—
much more than what is gained by applying an incoherent attack in BB84. The
difference is significant for any QBER less than 25%.
The error correction phase provides Eve further information. Equation (2.12) gives
a lower bound on the number of bits Alice and Bob need to exchange to correct the
errors, with an error probability of p = QBER in each bit. The bound is valid for
an error process affecting each bit individually, but in our protocol, the errors in
the bits obtained from one qubit pair are correlated due to entanglement. However,
we can apply the bound to our protocol as well, since correcting pairwise correlated
errors cannot be more demanding than correcting independent errors. That is, Alice
and Bob can treat the errors as uncorrelated. Because the number of exchanged bits
only depends on the QBER, the differences of the lines in Fig. 4.7 remain the same
after adding to them the information provided by the error-correction step. Thus,
for a given QBER, our protocol provides Eve strictly less information with c2 and
c3 chosen properly, assuming that Eve uses the described IR attack.
Which gate A (c1, c2, c3) should Alice and Bob choose? The answer is complicated
by the fact that any practical implementation of the protocol includes a quantum
channel with a finite error rate. Eve’s interference acts as an approximate, although
poor, model for the noise in the quantum channel. While the choice A
(
0, pi
2
, 0
)
limits
Eve’s information most effectively for any QBER, it also presumably amplifies the
noise in the quantum channel the most. Whether this amplification is tolerable
depends on the noise. However, since Eve’s information decreases rapidly compared
to the increase in QBER in the upper part of the envelope curve shown in Fig. 4.7, it
is plausible that even for a very noisy channel a non-identity gate benefits Alice and
Bob. Moreover, the noise of a practical quantum channel decreases as technology
advances.
For instance, assume that Alice and Bob employ the gate A
(
0, pi
2
, 0
)
corresponding
to the lowest dashed line in Fig. 4.7. Assume also that the inherent noise of the
used quantum channel results in a QBER of at most 10%. If Eve’s interference is
used as a model for the noise, the QBER is doubled by the gate, since QBER =
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Figure 4.7: Eve’s maximal mutual information and the induced QBER for BB84
(solid line) and for our protocol with gate settings c2 =
pi
8
, pi
4
, pi
2
and c1 = c3 = 0,
denoted by the uppermost, middle, and lowest dashed line, respectively. Eve employs
an IR attack. The sparsely dashed line denotes the envelope curve of the set shown
in Fig. 4.6.
ξ/4 without the gate, and QBER = ξ/2 with the gate. Hence, we assume that if
the gate is employed, Alice and Bob must accept a 20% QBER. Without the gate,
Eve’s maximal information can be limited to 0.2 bits, and with the gate to 0.05 bits.
That is, the gate reduces Eve’s information to 1/4 of that in BB84 even if the noise
is taken into account. Exactly which gate to employ depends on the actual noise of
the realized quantum channel, however.
4.4 EPR-pair attack
Since Alice and Bob utilize entanglement to keep their key a secret, it is an intuitive
idea for Eve to also make use of this resource. One way of taking advantage of en-
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tanglement in eavesdropping is to send qubits of an EPR pair, defined in Eq. (3.33),
to Bob. Let us label the qubits of the EPR pair as
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉1|0〉2 + |1〉1|1〉2) . (4.50)
After intercepting the first qubit of the transmitted pair, Eve sends qubit 1 of an
EPR pair to Bob while keeping qubit 2 for herself. Bob acknowledges the reception of
the first qubit, and Alice sends the second qubit which Eve also intercepts. Eve can,
e.g., measure the intercepted qubits, and based on the result, apply a single-qubit
transformation to the second qubit of the EPR pair which she then sends to Bob.
More complicated transformations involving the intercepted qubits are also possible.
Eve has thus sent Bob a qubit pair in an entangled state one qubit at a time, and
has partial control over the state of the pair after learning the measurement results
for both intercepted transmissions.
For instance, assume that Alice and Bob have chosen U1 := CNOT (H ⊗ I) as
their two-qubit unitary transformation. CNOT is the non-local controlled-not op-
eration which transforms input states as
CNOT:

|00〉 → |00〉
|01〉 → |01〉
|10〉 → |11〉
|11〉 → |10〉
and H is the Hadamard gate that transforms |0〉 → (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and |1〉 →
(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2. The only BB84 states |a1〉|a2〉 not resulting in a tensor product
state with the application of U1 are states |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉. These states are
transformed into the Bell states by U1 as
U1|00〉 = |Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2 , (4.51)
U1|01〉 = |Ψ+〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉)/
√
2 , (4.52)
U1|10〉 = |Φ−〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2 , (4.53)
U1|11〉 = |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/
√
2 . (4.54)
Assume that Eve has some way of knowing if Alice uses the z basis for the initial
state |a1〉|a2〉. This capability would, of course, severely compromise the security of
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any BB84-based QKD protocol. Nevertheless, let us demonstrate how Eve could in
this case eavesdrop on the transmission and still preserve its entanglement. If Alice
has chosen some other combination of bases than zz for the qubits, Eve attacks the
unentangled transmission using any strategy suitable for the original BB84 protocol.
However, if Alice’s choice of bases is zz, Eve knows to expect a transmission of a
qubit pair in one of the Bell states, and does the following.
Eve intercepts and stores the first transmitted qubit in short-term quantum mem-
ory, and immediately sends qubit 1 of the pair in Eq. (4.50) to Bob. She then in-
tercepts and stores the second transmitted qubit and is thus in possession of the
transmitted qubit pair as well as the second qubit of the EPR pair. Eve undoes U1
by applying U †1 = (H ⊗ I)CNOT to the intercepted pair, after which she measures
the qubits in z basis, thus recovering a1 and a2 exactly. Based on the result, Eve
chooses a single-qubit gate
Ea1a2 = I (σx)
a2 (σz)
a1 , (4.55)
which she applies to qubit 2 of the EPR pair. This transforms the pair to the state
that Alice transmitted, i.e., (I ⊗Ea1a2) |Φ+〉 = U1|a1〉|a2〉. Eve sends the second
qubit to Bob, who applies U †1 to the qubit pair. Bob measures the qubits in the z
basis, and recovers a1 and a2. That is, Bob observes a zero QBER while Eve has
full knowledge about the key bits Alice and Bob established, given that Alice used
the zz basis. Note that this result only applies if Alice’s basis choices are available
to Eve at the time of the quantum transmission—a feature that would render the
original BB84 protocol useless. The utilization of entanglement in eavesdropping is
not discussed further in this Thesis.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
We have introduced and studied the properties of a novel BB84-based protocol for
quantum key distribution. The proposed protocol utilizes entanglement of the trans-
mitted quantum states to provide advantage against an eavesdropper. We derived
a practical model for the entangling transformation, and simulated the protocol nu-
merically over a subset of the transformations. We considered the security of the
protocol under an intercept-resend attack. In the simulation, we recorded the infor-
mation of the eavesdropper on the established key and the quantum bit error rate
induced by the attack.
We find that entangling the states of the transmitted qubit pairs properly yields
significant advantage to the legitimate users. The maximal mutual information
available to an eavesdropper can be controlled in the range from 0.125 to 0.5 bits.
Decreasing the maximal information increases the quantum bit error rate to at most
50%. For a given quantum bit error rate below 25%, the maximum information that
an intercept-resend attack provides is reduced by a factor of eight. Since eaves-
dropping causes more disturbance to the quantum transmission than in the original
protocol, an eavesdropper is detected more easily. In other words, for a given error
rate, an eavesdropper must reduce his or her interference with the quantum channel,
and thus acquire less information.
In practice, the entangling transformation also amplifies the inherent noise in the
realized quantum channel. The transformation acts as controllable leverage in the
protocol—while it limits the information of an eavesdropper, it also amplifies the
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effects of noise and eavesdropping. Thus, it may not be practical to reduce the
maximal information of an eavesdropper to its minimum, since the noise may be
amplified too much. However, the amplification of the noise does not reduce the
benefits of the protocol substantially. Furthermore, as technology advances, the
inherent noise of a quantum channel can be decreased. Studying the amplification
of a channel noise in detail is a possible topic for future research.
In our protocol, an eavesdropper is assured to have only one-by-one access to the
transmitted particles. We studied how much this, in general, restricts the capability
of the eavesdropper of obtaining the transmitted entangled state. We maximized
numerically the minimal error in approximating an entangled two-qubit state with a
product state. We found that the maximum of the minimal error in the approxima-
tion is 0.673. Thus, even if the eavesdropper was equipped with a perfect quantum
cloner, the proposed protocol would impose a significant hindrance to him or her.
In addition, we described a novel attack type against the proposed protocol and
showed that it enables an eavesdropper to imitate the entanglement in the transmis-
sion. In this so-called EPR-pair attack, the eavesdropper captures the transmitted
states and replaces them with the halves of an EPR pair. We showed that in a spe-
cial case and under strong assumptions on the capabilities of the attacker and the
entangling transformation, this attack allows the eavesdropper to gain full knowl-
edge on the generated key. Note that these assumptions would render BB84 useless.
Detailed investigation of this attack type is left for future research.
Suggestions for topics of future research also include the following. The security of
the protocol could be analyzed in the presence of an attacker with more capabilities
than what we have allowed. Firstly, the attacker can be allowed to measure the
transmissions individually in any basis, implementable by allowing the use of arbi-
trary single-qubit gates, and to adjust each measurement based on previous results.
Secondly, the security could be analyzed under an optimal incoherent attack, and,
if possible, in the case of a collective attack. If the advantage is not lost under the
most general attack, entangling the states of more than two particles would probably
create an even larger advantage, since the dimension of an N -qubit state increases
exponentially in N .
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